Another Mass-ively disappointing output by A. J. Mass, one of ESPN's fantasy baseball columnists. I give Mass a little credit for taking an analytical approach to his work, but only a little, because as an analyst, he just is not very good. His most recent article "The True Value of FIP" evidences this.
The True Value of FIP
Lost in all the hoopla of Jim Joyce's call at first base during Armando Galarraga's attempt at perfection was the fact the Detroit Tigers pitcher was lucky to still have been in a position to make history. If not for Austin Jackson making a spectacular grab on Mark Grudzielanek's fly ball, the Indians would have had their first hit a couple of batters sooner, and with zero controversy.
A quick aside (this paragraph has little to do with the article, so it's a good spot for an aside): I, like everybody else, watched the non-perfect-perfect-game-play, ad nauseam. So far, I am the only person I know (except for my friend's wife) who thinks it was not such a bad call. It is really hard to tell, even in super slow motion, when the pitcher has control of the ball. The runner was probably out, and given the circumstances it is pretty weak that the ump did not give the pitcher the benefit of the call, but I do not think it is the huge travesty that everybody else seems to think it is. OK, back to the article.
Pitchers, in fact, have very little control over what happens once balls get put into play. Bad hops, bounced throws, balls that fall into the stands just out of the reach of an outstretched glove -- there's nothing a pitcher can do about any of those things, except shrug his shoulders and forge on. Through the sabermetric work of Voros McCracken, Tom Tango and others, it became very clear that in order to truly measure the impact on the result of a game made by an individual pitcher, you had to take defense out of the equation. And thus, a new stat, Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) was born.
Nice. I am a fan of FIP (though I prefer xFIP), so I like this so far.
What is FIP? It's a measure of how successfully a pitcher takes matters into his own hands, for better or for worse. Combining home runs allowed, walks and strikeouts -- none of which the defense can do anything about -- FIP creates a single number that attempts to be a better predictor of a pitcher's future ERA than his ERA itself.
It is after this paragraph that an astute reader can tell that the rest of the article is likely to be bad, as Mass already shows a lack of understanding of FIP. FIP is not a measure of "how successfully a pitcher takes matters into his own hands, for better or for worse." FIP, like ERA, is a measure of how effective a pitcher is. A low FIP means good pitching, a high one means bad pitching. Unlike ERA, it is calculated using only stats that the pitcher has almost sole control of. We can think of FIP as measuring a pitcher's performance "in a vacuum" and of ERA as measuring a pitcher's performance "on the diamond". That's a much better description of FIP than what Mass gives, because it is actually accurate.
A Basic FIP Formula: FIP = [(13*HR) + (3*BB) - (2*K)]/IP + 3.10
Proponents of FIP would have us believe that if a pitcher's ERA is far lower than his FIP, we should expect a regression the following season. Similarly, if a pitcher has a higher ERA than FIP, then he was probably more unlucky than anything else, and due for a bounce-back campaign. So how does that play so far in 2010? Let's go to the leaderboard and see:
2010 ERA Leaders
Through June 4
Monday, June 7, 2010
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Something's Not Quite Right Here
Dan Pompei of the Chicago Tribune handicaps the Bears' wide receiver race. There are six receivers expected to make the roster, and he gives odds for each to be in "the top three". Here's the breakdown, with the odds also converted to a rounded percentage:
Devin Hester - 4 to 5 (56%)
Johnny Knox - Even (50%)
Devin Aromashodu - 3 to 1 (25%)
Earl Bennett - 10 to 1 (9%)
Juaquin Iglesias - 30 to 1 (3%)
Rashied Davis - 40 to 1 (2%)
Notice anything? Six receivers, three spots, you would expect the percentages to average out to about 50%, right? It looks like Dan expects there to be about a receiver and a half in the Bears' top three. Are they going to line up with a lot of 10-man empty slot formations this fall?
(Feel free to mock my pedantry, but hey, there hasn't been a new post in awhile, and I thought this was at least mildly amusing.)
Devin Hester - 4 to 5 (56%)
Johnny Knox - Even (50%)
Devin Aromashodu - 3 to 1 (25%)
Earl Bennett - 10 to 1 (9%)
Juaquin Iglesias - 30 to 1 (3%)
Rashied Davis - 40 to 1 (2%)
Notice anything? Six receivers, three spots, you would expect the percentages to average out to about 50%, right? It looks like Dan expects there to be about a receiver and a half in the Bears' top three. Are they going to line up with a lot of 10-man empty slot formations this fall?
(Feel free to mock my pedantry, but hey, there hasn't been a new post in awhile, and I thought this was at least mildly amusing.)
Saturday, May 8, 2010
No Mexicans Allowed
I came across a piece that actually rivals anything that David Fleming has ever written for the title of "Stupidest Sports Article Ever". Now the comparison may be a little unfair - Flem writes for one of the most well-known sports media outlets in the world, and this piece, by Edgar Zuniga, appears on Yanks Abroad, a soccer site that few people have probably heard of. But still, this was too good to resist:
Wait...what is Mexico doing in the middle of the United States?
Dunno, trying to stay away from Arizona?
A quick geography lesson for ya: The official name of our neighbor to the south is Estados Unidos Mexicanos. This is ironic, considering how much Mexican soccer fans despise los Estados Unidos.
Yes, two neighboring countries are named similarly, yet despise each other's soccer teams. This is about as ironic as the cat being caught by the very person who was trying to catch him.
If you were to ask any Mexican how they feel about sharing a border with the US, they will attest that being located next to the US is both a blessing and a curse.
I bet you'd get a few differing opinions.
The politics of US-Mexico relations fuel alot [sic] of the hatred involved in the soccer rivalry. However, you have to remember that there always exists a thin line between love and hate.
OK, I'll keep that in mind.
And, when you start talking dollars, Mexicans change their tone. They love our dollars.
Take note, this theme runs bizarrely through the article, but it never becomes clear exactly what Edgar's point is.
Hold on, we're not talking politics here.
Good, "they love our dollars" doesn't really strike me as a political statement. Thanks for clarifying, though.
This is about a topic that has been simmering for quite a few years and is beginning to reach the boiling point as more US soccer fans become educated about the game and start paying attention to how other nations deal with their arch-rivals.
By hiring goon-squads to take them out, presumably.
As you read this, Mexico is looking forward to playing several World Cup warm-up games on American soil.
I'm shocked!
Having already played games against Bolivia, New Zealand and Iceland in various American cities, Mexico also has games booked against Ecuador (Meadowlands), Senegal (Chicago) and an opponent yet to be determined (Houston).
Wherever you live in the US, sooner or later, during 2010, the Mexican team will play somewhere near you.
I wonder who they're playing in Anchorage.
While it's interesting to see Mexico try to pull off their insane pre-World Cup schedule (which includes games in Europe) without crashing and burning out in the process, can you guess how many, out of 12 games, they're going to be playing at home?
Six? Four? How about two? Yes, two.
In fact, while Mexico scheduled only two games at home, they're slyly making themselves a home away from home in the US, playing six to seven matches.
Why won't Mexico play international opponents in the filth and smog of Azteca? Maybe those other teams realized what a dump it is and rejected the offer.
I'm guessing Edgar has never been to Azteca, because it's quite a beautiful stadium, and there's nothing filthy about it. I'll concede that the air quality is probably a concern for prospective visitors, but it's not nearly as bad as the stereotype.
But what about the many other suitable stadiums across Mexico? There are a couple of really nice stadiums in Pachuca and Guadalajara.
But you know what? It really has nothing to do with the stadiums.
What do Mexicans love most about the US? In the words of Wu-Tang Clan's Method Man, "Cash rules everything around me. C.R.E.A.M. Get the money. Dollar dollar bill y'all."
That's right, it all boils down to money.
Well, for Mexico maybe it does. For opponents logistics are probably important as well. Most flights from anywhere in the Eastern Hemisphere to Mexico go through the US anyway, it's probably easier to find decent training grounds in the US, security isn't as much of a concern, and so on.
Why the hell is Mexico, our arch-rival, allowed to play wherever the hell they want, whenever the hell they want and rake in dollar bills to benefit the Mexican Football Federation (FMF)?
It's a free country, as long as your papers are in order.
The FMF knows that there are millions of Mexicans living in the US and so, depending on where they play, they'll attract large crowds and be pulling in dollars instead of pesos.
Edgar seems really hung up on this dollar vs. peso distinction. Now, I'm sure the FMF has to transact much of its business in dollars, and that it's pretty useful to have dollars on hand. But does Edgar realize that one currency can be exchanged for another at these advanced institutions called banks? Sure the bank takes a small cut, but the real issue here is the value of the money generated, not the particular currency that's taken in. If there happened to be 12 million Mexicans living in Guatemala, I'm sure the FMF would gladly stage matches there, pull in the quetzales, and exchange them for dollars or pesos.
It's interesting to note that the peso was the first currency in the world to use the "$" sign, which the US dollar later adopted for its own use when the US adopted the peso as currency during the period before adopting the dollar.
It's interesting that you decided to straight up plagiarize a sentence from a Wikipedia page, but didn't even pick one that made sense. The US dollar adopted the symbol for its use before the US adopted the dollar?
There's some sick irony in all this.
Like rain on your wedding day...
History lessons aside, all this makes you wonder about the relationship between the US Soccer Federation (USSF) and the FMF and why they're letting the Mexican team have the run of the land.
Yes, and maybe your column would useful if you explored those reasons, rather than just ranting about what a travesty it is.
If you call yourself a US soccer fan and have a pulse, by this point, you should be visibly upset. Seriously, you should be angry.
I guess there's something wrong with my emotional compass.
How much is the USSF making out of this arrangement? What's their cut?
See the comment before last.
Do you think that the English FA would ever allow the German National Team to play friendlies all over England? What if Argentina's AFA let Brazil do the same?
Probably so, if the arrangements were beneficial in some way to England or Argentina respectively. But the point is moot, of course, as there aren't 12 million Germans living in England, nor do the logistical issues I mentioned earlier apply.
For those new to soccer, this is unconceivable.
It's "unconceivable" because Germany has no reason to play its friendlies in England, not because of any burning hatred.
Mexico playing friendlies in the US is equivalent to Ohio State University playing most of their football games in Michigan Stadium or the San Francisco Giants playing their home games at Dodger Stadium. That just doesn't happen.
No, really it's not. Going hundreds miles away from your fan base when you have a perfectly serviceable stadium right near home makes no sense. However, Mexico has a large fan base in the US. And it's not like they're playing in US Soccer's home stadium, as US Soccer doesn't have a home stadium. Finally, we're talking about exhibitions, and not meaningful games.
If it does, it's a clear sign that the Apocalypse is upon us.
When the hell has the US ever played an exhibition game in Mexico against someone other than Mexico for the purpose of making some pesos? Never!
Since we don't do X because it makes no sense for us to do X, Mexico shouldn't do X when it makes perfect sense for them to do X!
Not only would the Mexican fans be furious but they'd make the US feel as unwelcome as possible. You can be sure that Mexican fans would bash the FMF and question their actions.
Mexican fans certainly make the US feel unwelcome when it is in their interests to do so, ie. when the US is playing Mexico. But honestly I think the reaction to a US/third-party friendly in Mexico would be more like bemused indifference.
It's also sad that the Mexican team is playing more games on American soil than the US. While Mexico enjoys their farewell tour, the US has just one more game scheduled at home before the World Cup.
No, we have games scheduled against Turkey and the Czech Republic.
Now, I can already hear the arguments in support of letting Mexico play in the US. Do they sell out the stadiums? Not entirely, but they draw more fans than the US does (which is embarrassing).
Do their fans bring in alot of revenue to the stadiums and surrounding businesses? For the most part, yes.
Is seeing Mexico play this much on American soil giving Team USA an opportunity to scout Mexico? Yeah, you can say that.
As noted by many of the commentators to the article, the Mexican friendlies are promoted by Soccer United Marketing, which also happens to be marketing division of MLS. The USSF certainly has an interest in the promotion and success of MLS, so it's good that SUM gets a cut from these friendlies. I would imagine it's possible that the USSF directly gets a share of the proceeds in exchange for it's permission, but I won't look it up, because I don't want to do all of Edgar's work for him.
I can also hear some people out there saying that this whole argument against Mexico is adolescent and are probably asking what the big deal is with letting them play here. It's just business, right?
I think I'd use "infantile" rather than "adolescent".
Wrong.
I can only speak for myself when I say that there is no way I'm accepting money from my worst enemy to let him come into my house and use it to throw a party with all of his best friends and make a profit out of it.
That just ain't right, folks.
The US and Mexican national teams are enemies on the pitch, but have many common off-field interests. Aside from the monetary benefits that SUM and possibly the USSF receive from allowing these friendlies, we also have an interest in the Mexican squad improving. They are our frequent sparring partner, and the way to get better is play good teams. Furthermore it's good for us if CONCACAF shows well at the World Cup and other tournaments, as it could possibly increase the allotment for CONCACAF teams in future World Cups. And not being petty dicks to the Mexicans allows for things like this.
It's time for US fans to stop being so gosh darn nice and become more vocal about these sort of things.
We're not talking about some insane rebellion with torches and pitchforks in front of USSF headquarters (located on Prairie Avenue, in Chicago), but there needs to be an uprising.
Note the Flemingesque tendency to insert random irrelevant facts. Or was the location given here as a dog-whistle? Does Edgar really want us to take to Prairie Avenue in protest? But then why didn't he tell us the street number? Plausible deniability? Or does he want us to march up and down the street with our torches and pitchforks until we find the USSF headquarters?
Fans need to let the USSF know how they feel about the Federation allowing Mexico to play "home" games on our soil and tread on our fields like they were theirs. It simply isn't acceptable!
And, in case you need a rallying cry, just remember the motto of our national team.
Don't Tread On Me.
Or rather, Don't Tread Anywhere Near Me.
Wait...what is Mexico doing in the middle of the United States?
Dunno, trying to stay away from Arizona?
A quick geography lesson for ya: The official name of our neighbor to the south is Estados Unidos Mexicanos. This is ironic, considering how much Mexican soccer fans despise los Estados Unidos.
Yes, two neighboring countries are named similarly, yet despise each other's soccer teams. This is about as ironic as the cat being caught by the very person who was trying to catch him.
If you were to ask any Mexican how they feel about sharing a border with the US, they will attest that being located next to the US is both a blessing and a curse.
I bet you'd get a few differing opinions.
The politics of US-Mexico relations fuel alot [sic] of the hatred involved in the soccer rivalry. However, you have to remember that there always exists a thin line between love and hate.
OK, I'll keep that in mind.
And, when you start talking dollars, Mexicans change their tone. They love our dollars.
Take note, this theme runs bizarrely through the article, but it never becomes clear exactly what Edgar's point is.
Hold on, we're not talking politics here.
Good, "they love our dollars" doesn't really strike me as a political statement. Thanks for clarifying, though.
This is about a topic that has been simmering for quite a few years and is beginning to reach the boiling point as more US soccer fans become educated about the game and start paying attention to how other nations deal with their arch-rivals.
By hiring goon-squads to take them out, presumably.
As you read this, Mexico is looking forward to playing several World Cup warm-up games on American soil.
I'm shocked!
Having already played games against Bolivia, New Zealand and Iceland in various American cities, Mexico also has games booked against Ecuador (Meadowlands), Senegal (Chicago) and an opponent yet to be determined (Houston).
Wherever you live in the US, sooner or later, during 2010, the Mexican team will play somewhere near you.
I wonder who they're playing in Anchorage.
While it's interesting to see Mexico try to pull off their insane pre-World Cup schedule (which includes games in Europe) without crashing and burning out in the process, can you guess how many, out of 12 games, they're going to be playing at home?
Six? Four? How about two? Yes, two.
In fact, while Mexico scheduled only two games at home, they're slyly making themselves a home away from home in the US, playing six to seven matches.
Why won't Mexico play international opponents in the filth and smog of Azteca? Maybe those other teams realized what a dump it is and rejected the offer.
I'm guessing Edgar has never been to Azteca, because it's quite a beautiful stadium, and there's nothing filthy about it. I'll concede that the air quality is probably a concern for prospective visitors, but it's not nearly as bad as the stereotype.
But what about the many other suitable stadiums across Mexico? There are a couple of really nice stadiums in Pachuca and Guadalajara.
But you know what? It really has nothing to do with the stadiums.
What do Mexicans love most about the US? In the words of Wu-Tang Clan's Method Man, "Cash rules everything around me. C.R.E.A.M. Get the money. Dollar dollar bill y'all."
That's right, it all boils down to money.
Well, for Mexico maybe it does. For opponents logistics are probably important as well. Most flights from anywhere in the Eastern Hemisphere to Mexico go through the US anyway, it's probably easier to find decent training grounds in the US, security isn't as much of a concern, and so on.
Why the hell is Mexico, our arch-rival, allowed to play wherever the hell they want, whenever the hell they want and rake in dollar bills to benefit the Mexican Football Federation (FMF)?
It's a free country, as long as your papers are in order.
The FMF knows that there are millions of Mexicans living in the US and so, depending on where they play, they'll attract large crowds and be pulling in dollars instead of pesos.
Edgar seems really hung up on this dollar vs. peso distinction. Now, I'm sure the FMF has to transact much of its business in dollars, and that it's pretty useful to have dollars on hand. But does Edgar realize that one currency can be exchanged for another at these advanced institutions called banks? Sure the bank takes a small cut, but the real issue here is the value of the money generated, not the particular currency that's taken in. If there happened to be 12 million Mexicans living in Guatemala, I'm sure the FMF would gladly stage matches there, pull in the quetzales, and exchange them for dollars or pesos.
It's interesting to note that the peso was the first currency in the world to use the "$" sign, which the US dollar later adopted for its own use when the US adopted the peso as currency during the period before adopting the dollar.
It's interesting that you decided to straight up plagiarize a sentence from a Wikipedia page, but didn't even pick one that made sense. The US dollar adopted the symbol for its use before the US adopted the dollar?
There's some sick irony in all this.
Like rain on your wedding day...
History lessons aside, all this makes you wonder about the relationship between the US Soccer Federation (USSF) and the FMF and why they're letting the Mexican team have the run of the land.
Yes, and maybe your column would useful if you explored those reasons, rather than just ranting about what a travesty it is.
If you call yourself a US soccer fan and have a pulse, by this point, you should be visibly upset. Seriously, you should be angry.
I guess there's something wrong with my emotional compass.
How much is the USSF making out of this arrangement? What's their cut?
See the comment before last.
Do you think that the English FA would ever allow the German National Team to play friendlies all over England? What if Argentina's AFA let Brazil do the same?
Probably so, if the arrangements were beneficial in some way to England or Argentina respectively. But the point is moot, of course, as there aren't 12 million Germans living in England, nor do the logistical issues I mentioned earlier apply.
For those new to soccer, this is unconceivable.
It's "unconceivable" because Germany has no reason to play its friendlies in England, not because of any burning hatred.
Mexico playing friendlies in the US is equivalent to Ohio State University playing most of their football games in Michigan Stadium or the San Francisco Giants playing their home games at Dodger Stadium. That just doesn't happen.
No, really it's not. Going hundreds miles away from your fan base when you have a perfectly serviceable stadium right near home makes no sense. However, Mexico has a large fan base in the US. And it's not like they're playing in US Soccer's home stadium, as US Soccer doesn't have a home stadium. Finally, we're talking about exhibitions, and not meaningful games.
If it does, it's a clear sign that the Apocalypse is upon us.
When the hell has the US ever played an exhibition game in Mexico against someone other than Mexico for the purpose of making some pesos? Never!
Since we don't do X because it makes no sense for us to do X, Mexico shouldn't do X when it makes perfect sense for them to do X!
Not only would the Mexican fans be furious but they'd make the US feel as unwelcome as possible. You can be sure that Mexican fans would bash the FMF and question their actions.
Mexican fans certainly make the US feel unwelcome when it is in their interests to do so, ie. when the US is playing Mexico. But honestly I think the reaction to a US/third-party friendly in Mexico would be more like bemused indifference.
It's also sad that the Mexican team is playing more games on American soil than the US. While Mexico enjoys their farewell tour, the US has just one more game scheduled at home before the World Cup.
No, we have games scheduled against Turkey and the Czech Republic.
Now, I can already hear the arguments in support of letting Mexico play in the US. Do they sell out the stadiums? Not entirely, but they draw more fans than the US does (which is embarrassing).
Do their fans bring in alot of revenue to the stadiums and surrounding businesses? For the most part, yes.
Is seeing Mexico play this much on American soil giving Team USA an opportunity to scout Mexico? Yeah, you can say that.
As noted by many of the commentators to the article, the Mexican friendlies are promoted by Soccer United Marketing, which also happens to be marketing division of MLS. The USSF certainly has an interest in the promotion and success of MLS, so it's good that SUM gets a cut from these friendlies. I would imagine it's possible that the USSF directly gets a share of the proceeds in exchange for it's permission, but I won't look it up, because I don't want to do all of Edgar's work for him.
I can also hear some people out there saying that this whole argument against Mexico is adolescent and are probably asking what the big deal is with letting them play here. It's just business, right?
I think I'd use "infantile" rather than "adolescent".
Wrong.
I can only speak for myself when I say that there is no way I'm accepting money from my worst enemy to let him come into my house and use it to throw a party with all of his best friends and make a profit out of it.
That just ain't right, folks.
The US and Mexican national teams are enemies on the pitch, but have many common off-field interests. Aside from the monetary benefits that SUM and possibly the USSF receive from allowing these friendlies, we also have an interest in the Mexican squad improving. They are our frequent sparring partner, and the way to get better is play good teams. Furthermore it's good for us if CONCACAF shows well at the World Cup and other tournaments, as it could possibly increase the allotment for CONCACAF teams in future World Cups. And not being petty dicks to the Mexicans allows for things like this.
It's time for US fans to stop being so gosh darn nice and become more vocal about these sort of things.
We're not talking about some insane rebellion with torches and pitchforks in front of USSF headquarters (located on Prairie Avenue, in Chicago), but there needs to be an uprising.
Note the Flemingesque tendency to insert random irrelevant facts. Or was the location given here as a dog-whistle? Does Edgar really want us to take to Prairie Avenue in protest? But then why didn't he tell us the street number? Plausible deniability? Or does he want us to march up and down the street with our torches and pitchforks until we find the USSF headquarters?
Fans need to let the USSF know how they feel about the Federation allowing Mexico to play "home" games on our soil and tread on our fields like they were theirs. It simply isn't acceptable!
And, in case you need a rallying cry, just remember the motto of our national team.
Don't Tread On Me.
Or rather, Don't Tread Anywhere Near Me.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Gambler's Fallacy Fallacy?
I was intrigued by the title of this article by AJ Mass, but it turns out to not be very good. Mass correctly defines gambler's fallacy, and his large point -- that a hot or cold streak tells us little about a baseball player's future performance -- is a good one. However, he seems to be under the impression that gambler's fallacy means that all future outcomes are of equal likelihood, which is generally not the case at all. Despite his casino experience, he also does not seem to have a firm grasp on the law of large numbers. You often can predict a player's batting statistics with reasonable accuracy over long stretches of a season (and when you cannot, it usually has nothing to do with gambler's fallacy).
Mass also fails to point out the obvious concerning a recent Cincinnati Reds victory over Roy Oswalt, who was 23-1 in his last 24 decisions against them before the loss. Oswalt used to be an amazing pitcher on good Astros teams playing mediocre or bad Reds teams, and now Oswalt is a decent pitcher on a terrible Astros team playing a decent Reds team. It is not a fallacy on my part to say another loss to the Reds was likely.
Mass also fails to point out the obvious concerning a recent Cincinnati Reds victory over Roy Oswalt, who was 23-1 in his last 24 decisions against them before the loss. Oswalt used to be an amazing pitcher on good Astros teams playing mediocre or bad Reds teams, and now Oswalt is a decent pitcher on a terrible Astros team playing a decent Reds team. It is not a fallacy on my part to say another loss to the Reds was likely.
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Hopeful Change
Good to see that the NFL changed the overtime rule for postseason games. The rule is still less than ideal, but it's a step in the right direction. And the reaction was good for a little blog fodder, courtesy of Brad Biggs of the Chicago Tribune, who scores a great point against proponents of the change:
The new system would mandate that if the team that wins the coin flip kicks a field goal on the first possession of overtime, it would be forced to kick off.
Of course, no one backing this plan mentions that earlier in the playoffs the Packers lost on the opening possession in overtime after Aaron Rodgers fumbled and the Cardinals' Karlos Dansby returned it for a touchdown.
Right, backers of the plan frequently cite the statistic that the receiving team has won 60% of overtime games since kickoffs were move back in 1994, and believe that to be an unacceptable advantage. They also think that teams playing exclusively for a field goal detracts from the excitement of the game. Mentioning that the kicking team managed to win with a touchdown once really blows a huge hole in both of those arguments.
Then he convincingly argues that the change would be a disaster for the Bears:
All the Bears need to do is examine their own recent history to realize they should vote against any change. For starters, the Bears are 11-3 in the last 10 seasons in overtime and 8-1 under Lovie Smith, including an overtime victory over the Seahawks in the divisional round of the 2006 playoffs.
Ah, yes, the Monsters of Overtime, sample size be damned. Also, never mind the fact that exactly two current Bears - Urlacher and Kretuz - were even on the team 10 years ago. (Hell, there are only three offensive starters from the 2006 NFC champs still with the team.) It's obvious that the Chicago Bears as an organization have adapted to overtime, as well as to cold weather.
Then, if they're still in doubt, they need to consider that with the third-most accurate kicker in NFL history, they would be foolish to vote for any system that limits the possible outcome[sic] Robbie Gould can have on a game.
Dropping the ironicalism for a moment, I'll admit the point about Gould is a fair one. Having a awesome kicker is more of a boost under the current rules, although not nearly so much as having an offense that can get the ball into field goal position, and a defense that can keep the opponents from moving the ball. But I guess it's beyond Biggs to string two convincing sentences together:
In the last decade, the Bears are 4-1 in games ending with a field goal on the first possession of overtime.
Which proves absolutely fuck all without knowing how many of those 13 games the Bears had the ball first. I think a reasonably intelligent 7 year-old would be able to grasp that point. Too much for your average sportswriter, I suppose.
The new system would mandate that if the team that wins the coin flip kicks a field goal on the first possession of overtime, it would be forced to kick off.
Of course, no one backing this plan mentions that earlier in the playoffs the Packers lost on the opening possession in overtime after Aaron Rodgers fumbled and the Cardinals' Karlos Dansby returned it for a touchdown.
Right, backers of the plan frequently cite the statistic that the receiving team has won 60% of overtime games since kickoffs were move back in 1994, and believe that to be an unacceptable advantage. They also think that teams playing exclusively for a field goal detracts from the excitement of the game. Mentioning that the kicking team managed to win with a touchdown once really blows a huge hole in both of those arguments.
Then he convincingly argues that the change would be a disaster for the Bears:
All the Bears need to do is examine their own recent history to realize they should vote against any change. For starters, the Bears are 11-3 in the last 10 seasons in overtime and 8-1 under Lovie Smith, including an overtime victory over the Seahawks in the divisional round of the 2006 playoffs.
Ah, yes, the Monsters of Overtime, sample size be damned. Also, never mind the fact that exactly two current Bears - Urlacher and Kretuz - were even on the team 10 years ago. (Hell, there are only three offensive starters from the 2006 NFC champs still with the team.) It's obvious that the Chicago Bears as an organization have adapted to overtime, as well as to cold weather.
Then, if they're still in doubt, they need to consider that with the third-most accurate kicker in NFL history, they would be foolish to vote for any system that limits the possible outcome[sic] Robbie Gould can have on a game.
Dropping the ironicalism for a moment, I'll admit the point about Gould is a fair one. Having a awesome kicker is more of a boost under the current rules, although not nearly so much as having an offense that can get the ball into field goal position, and a defense that can keep the opponents from moving the ball. But I guess it's beyond Biggs to string two convincing sentences together:
In the last decade, the Bears are 4-1 in games ending with a field goal on the first possession of overtime.
Which proves absolutely fuck all without knowing how many of those 13 games the Bears had the ball first. I think a reasonably intelligent 7 year-old would be able to grasp that point. Too much for your average sportswriter, I suppose.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
There's No Defense (for this garbage article by David Fleming)
David Fleming, senior writer for ESPN The Magazine, and frequent contributor to espn.com Page 2, once again proves that, with regards to sports, you can basically say whatever you want, no matter how insipid, no matter how unreasoned, no matter how wrong, and have it pass as legitimate writing. Nobody will call you out, except possibly a blogger with a readership in the single digits. To this end, I give you the masterpiece below. As usual, the bold comments are mine.
Five Reasons Why NFL Defenses Stink
By David Fleming
Suppose you are a slightly smarter-than-average 8th grader writing an essay with the above title for English class. Wouldn't you immediately think to provide proof, or at least some semblance of justification, that NFL defenses really do stink? You'd recognize the importance of this, right? After all, if NFL defenses don't stink then the whole exercise of providing five reasons why they stink is pretty much pointless, right? Just keep that in mind as you read.
I have always thought of Detroit Lions defensive coordinator Gunther Cunningham as one of those cool, leathery, old-school guys with great stories; a perpetually hoarse, gravelly voice; and tremendous passion for the game. But after railing against the sad state of defense in the NFL in a recent story by Tom Kowalski, Cunningham is starting to sound more like an angry, confused old guy in plaid slacks yelling at you to stay off his grass.
"Throughout the league, I've never seen offensive statistics as good, or defenses as bad," Cunningham said.
By now, Gunny should be an expert on horrific defenses. His 2-9 Lions team is ranked dead last in defense the NFL. To be fair, Detroit has been decimated by a decade of bad drafts and a rash of injuries. But this is the worst defense I've seen since, maybe, Cunningham's 2008 squad in Kansas City, which finished 31st out of 32 teams.
Wouldn't the team that finished 32nd be even worse? Just askin'.
Not that any of this is Cunningham's fault, mind you. "There's a real problem for the defensive side of the ball, and NCAA started all of this, as far as I'm concerned," Cunningham said. "I study this game and wonder why all of these things are happening, and that's my personal opinion. It's arguable, but I'd love to argue it."
OK, I'm game.
All in all, this is actually a decent start for Flem. He's calling out Cunningham for being a lousy defensive coordinator and a gibberish-talking curmudgeon, both of which seem valid. Unfortunately, the article doesn't end here.
Apparently, Gunny doesn't like all the newfangled, fancy, super spread offenses -- which is a really bad sign for Lions fans, given that he's in a profession based on change, speed and adaptability. As I wrote a year ago in an extensive cover story for ESPN The Magazine about the evolution of offense, the NFL's future doesn't belong to mammoth tackles, statuesque quarterbacks or crabby old-school coaches. It belongs to the next generation of fast-thinking thrill-seekers weaned on the Web, iPods and "Madden."
Fleming writes cover stories?! See, you can say anything and it qualifies as legitimate writing. Never mind the fact that the average weight of an NFL tackle is 318 lbs., up 13% from the late '80s. Never mind the fact that out of the top 10 quarterbacks currently in the NFL at least four of them are "statuesque" by any reasonable interpretation of the word (Manning, Brady, Favre, Warner), and two others don't move so great either (Roethlisberger and Rivers). And never mind the fact that the last sentence of the paragraph is little more than a meaningless compilation of buzz words.
Incredibly, Cunningham blames most of this mess on the fact that the NCAA allows athletes to practice for only 20 hours a week -- forcing the 99 percent of college players who will never make the NFL to do stupid stuff like, you know, study and work toward a degree.
The truth of the matter is, the NFL has no one to blame but itself for the sad state of defenses.
And here's why:
Before Fleming gets into why something is true, he really should verify that, in fact, it is true. How could one verify that NFL defenses are in a sad state? Well, one idea would be to demonstrate a rise in scoring over the years. I'll do this for Fleming.
I've consider the current year (2009), last year (2008), then 2005, then 2000, then 1995, and so on, all the way to 1960. The average team score per game in these years: 21.5, 22.0, 20.6, 20.7, 21.5, 20.1, 21.5, 20.5, 20.6, 19.3, 23.1, 21.6. Yep, defenses are so sad today that they are only doing as well as they did in 1995 and 1985, and only doing slightly better than they did in 1965. Now let's look at average yardage totals per game in these years: 336.3, 327.2, 315.9, 319.4, 328.9, 308.6, 329.4, 323.5, 308.3, 281.8, 304.5, 303.8. There is a little more variance here than with points, and there might be a small uptick after 1975, but basically the same after that.
There is absolutely no indication that defenses are any worse now than they were at any other given moment in the last fifty years, with respect to scoring, and the last thirty years, with respect to yardage. So, just using the Internet, and about 15 minutes of time, I've basically destroyed the entire premise for this article. Again, the author writes cover stories for a reputable sports publication.
Let's keep going anyway.
1. The tenets of tackling have not changed in the last 75 years. Seriously -- you can pick up a football-fundamentals book from 1933 and put it next to one published this year, and the section on tackling is nearly identical. Tackling technique has not kept pace with the rest of the game.
Sure, football players learn how to tackle from studying football-fundamental books -- peer reviewed literature, I assume.
2. One of the NFL's dirty little secrets is that, after training camp, defenders do not practice tackling ball carriers all the way down to the ground. Seriously. With worries about injuries and depth and the salary cap, there is no tackling practice in the NFL from September to February. Imagine if quarterbacks didn't practice throwing, or if receivers didn't practice catching.
That naughty NFL.
3. In 1978, the league made it illegal for defenders to "bump" receivers after they've traveled five yards downfield, clearing the way for all the underneath crossing routes that are the backbone of the West Coast offense. That same year, the league also basically legalized holding by allowing linemen to extend their arms and open their hands without being flagged. The NFL regularly legislates advantages for offenses because -- duh -- passing and scoring sell. And these two rule changes made a huge impact on the game.
And these legislated advantages have increased scoring by approximately 0.0 points on average. Seriously, why wouldn't you just do a modicum of research before you write this drivel. This is your job! This is what you do all day. For God's sake, look some shit up!
4. With respect to size and speed, linebackers have not kept up with tight ends. In 2008, the average Pro Bowl tight end had three inches and 15 pounds on the average Pro Bowl linebacker. Assuming similar speed, that's a significant momentum advantage for tight ends.
Wow, did he look at all four pro bowl tight ends in this analysis or just one conference?
5. The popularity of the Cover 2. This defense relies on outside run support from cornerbacks, the smallest guys on the field. It also uses "leveraged" tackling -- a technique in which tacklers take angles that, if they miss, funnel the ball toward the strength of the defense. It sounds good, in theory. But it actually has tacklers thinking about missing before they even attack.
I think if you talk out of your ass long enough, and nobody stops you -- on the contrary, they pay you to do it -- you just keep going. You probably even start to believe it.
That's why NFL defenses stink right now.
And have stunk for the past 50 years, apparently.
It has nothing to do with the NCAA or any other ridiculous conspiracy.
Now, who wants to volunteer to tell Gunther?
Ugh... tripe, pure tripe.
Five Reasons Why NFL Defenses Stink
By David Fleming
Suppose you are a slightly smarter-than-average 8th grader writing an essay with the above title for English class. Wouldn't you immediately think to provide proof, or at least some semblance of justification, that NFL defenses really do stink? You'd recognize the importance of this, right? After all, if NFL defenses don't stink then the whole exercise of providing five reasons why they stink is pretty much pointless, right? Just keep that in mind as you read.
I have always thought of Detroit Lions defensive coordinator Gunther Cunningham as one of those cool, leathery, old-school guys with great stories; a perpetually hoarse, gravelly voice; and tremendous passion for the game. But after railing against the sad state of defense in the NFL in a recent story by Tom Kowalski, Cunningham is starting to sound more like an angry, confused old guy in plaid slacks yelling at you to stay off his grass.
"Throughout the league, I've never seen offensive statistics as good, or defenses as bad," Cunningham said.
By now, Gunny should be an expert on horrific defenses. His 2-9 Lions team is ranked dead last in defense the NFL. To be fair, Detroit has been decimated by a decade of bad drafts and a rash of injuries. But this is the worst defense I've seen since, maybe, Cunningham's 2008 squad in Kansas City, which finished 31st out of 32 teams.
Wouldn't the team that finished 32nd be even worse? Just askin'.
Not that any of this is Cunningham's fault, mind you. "There's a real problem for the defensive side of the ball, and NCAA started all of this, as far as I'm concerned," Cunningham said. "I study this game and wonder why all of these things are happening, and that's my personal opinion. It's arguable, but I'd love to argue it."
OK, I'm game.
All in all, this is actually a decent start for Flem. He's calling out Cunningham for being a lousy defensive coordinator and a gibberish-talking curmudgeon, both of which seem valid. Unfortunately, the article doesn't end here.
Apparently, Gunny doesn't like all the newfangled, fancy, super spread offenses -- which is a really bad sign for Lions fans, given that he's in a profession based on change, speed and adaptability. As I wrote a year ago in an extensive cover story for ESPN The Magazine about the evolution of offense, the NFL's future doesn't belong to mammoth tackles, statuesque quarterbacks or crabby old-school coaches. It belongs to the next generation of fast-thinking thrill-seekers weaned on the Web, iPods and "Madden."
Fleming writes cover stories?! See, you can say anything and it qualifies as legitimate writing. Never mind the fact that the average weight of an NFL tackle is 318 lbs., up 13% from the late '80s. Never mind the fact that out of the top 10 quarterbacks currently in the NFL at least four of them are "statuesque" by any reasonable interpretation of the word (Manning, Brady, Favre, Warner), and two others don't move so great either (Roethlisberger and Rivers). And never mind the fact that the last sentence of the paragraph is little more than a meaningless compilation of buzz words.
Incredibly, Cunningham blames most of this mess on the fact that the NCAA allows athletes to practice for only 20 hours a week -- forcing the 99 percent of college players who will never make the NFL to do stupid stuff like, you know, study and work toward a degree.
The truth of the matter is, the NFL has no one to blame but itself for the sad state of defenses.
And here's why:
Before Fleming gets into why something is true, he really should verify that, in fact, it is true. How could one verify that NFL defenses are in a sad state? Well, one idea would be to demonstrate a rise in scoring over the years. I'll do this for Fleming.
I've consider the current year (2009), last year (2008), then 2005, then 2000, then 1995, and so on, all the way to 1960. The average team score per game in these years: 21.5, 22.0, 20.6, 20.7, 21.5, 20.1, 21.5, 20.5, 20.6, 19.3, 23.1, 21.6. Yep, defenses are so sad today that they are only doing as well as they did in 1995 and 1985, and only doing slightly better than they did in 1965. Now let's look at average yardage totals per game in these years: 336.3, 327.2, 315.9, 319.4, 328.9, 308.6, 329.4, 323.5, 308.3, 281.8, 304.5, 303.8. There is a little more variance here than with points, and there might be a small uptick after 1975, but basically the same after that.
There is absolutely no indication that defenses are any worse now than they were at any other given moment in the last fifty years, with respect to scoring, and the last thirty years, with respect to yardage. So, just using the Internet, and about 15 minutes of time, I've basically destroyed the entire premise for this article. Again, the author writes cover stories for a reputable sports publication.
Let's keep going anyway.
1. The tenets of tackling have not changed in the last 75 years. Seriously -- you can pick up a football-fundamentals book from 1933 and put it next to one published this year, and the section on tackling is nearly identical. Tackling technique has not kept pace with the rest of the game.
Sure, football players learn how to tackle from studying football-fundamental books -- peer reviewed literature, I assume.
2. One of the NFL's dirty little secrets is that, after training camp, defenders do not practice tackling ball carriers all the way down to the ground. Seriously. With worries about injuries and depth and the salary cap, there is no tackling practice in the NFL from September to February. Imagine if quarterbacks didn't practice throwing, or if receivers didn't practice catching.
That naughty NFL.
3. In 1978, the league made it illegal for defenders to "bump" receivers after they've traveled five yards downfield, clearing the way for all the underneath crossing routes that are the backbone of the West Coast offense. That same year, the league also basically legalized holding by allowing linemen to extend their arms and open their hands without being flagged. The NFL regularly legislates advantages for offenses because -- duh -- passing and scoring sell. And these two rule changes made a huge impact on the game.
And these legislated advantages have increased scoring by approximately 0.0 points on average. Seriously, why wouldn't you just do a modicum of research before you write this drivel. This is your job! This is what you do all day. For God's sake, look some shit up!
4. With respect to size and speed, linebackers have not kept up with tight ends. In 2008, the average Pro Bowl tight end had three inches and 15 pounds on the average Pro Bowl linebacker. Assuming similar speed, that's a significant momentum advantage for tight ends.
Wow, did he look at all four pro bowl tight ends in this analysis or just one conference?
5. The popularity of the Cover 2. This defense relies on outside run support from cornerbacks, the smallest guys on the field. It also uses "leveraged" tackling -- a technique in which tacklers take angles that, if they miss, funnel the ball toward the strength of the defense. It sounds good, in theory. But it actually has tacklers thinking about missing before they even attack.
I think if you talk out of your ass long enough, and nobody stops you -- on the contrary, they pay you to do it -- you just keep going. You probably even start to believe it.
That's why NFL defenses stink right now.
And have stunk for the past 50 years, apparently.
It has nothing to do with the NCAA or any other ridiculous conspiracy.
Now, who wants to volunteer to tell Gunther?
Ugh... tripe, pure tripe.
Friday, November 27, 2009
Tidbits
Watching a clip of an old football game, I wondered: where does moving the goal posts to the back of the end zone rank in the annals of no-duh moves in professional sports? It's hard to believe it took over 50 years for the league to realize that giant metal posts protruding from the field of play is not such a great idea.
In baseball news, the MVP and Cy Young award voters did a good job this year. All four winners (Joe Mauer, Albert Pujols, Zack Greinke, and Tim Lincecum) were worthy of their awards. Historically voters have been known to overvalue things that are not great indicators of an individual's worth to his team, like team victories, stolen bases, and RBIs for a batter, and wins for a pitcher. This year they got it right, especially with Greinke, who was clearly the best pitcher in baseball last season, despite having just 16 wins (the fewest of any starting pitcher to ever win the AL Cy Young award during a non-strike shortened year).
In other baseball news, in this week's The New Yorker, there is an article chronicling the Yankees World Series-winning season by Roger Angell titled "Daddies Win: can we love the Yankees now?". (I can't find a link on-line. It's in the Nov. 30, 2009 issue.) It's one of the more annoying pieces I have read in a while. It's seven pages of the author performing literary fellatio on the Yankees. (Although, in a periodical named after a person from New York, what does one expect?) The article highlights, glorifies even, everything people outside of the Big Apple hate about the Yankees. Here's an excerpt.
While the roses are going around, we should revisit those free-agent signings of C. C. Sabathia, Mark Teixeira, and A. J. Burnett last winter, whose combined contracts cost the Yankees an extra $432.5 million, and accounted for $52 million out of the team's salary total of $201 million for 2009. (The next nearest is the Mets $135 million, and the farthest is the Marlins $36 million.) Cries of unfairness and fresh tropes about the unlevel playing field, so ferocious in March, seemed fainter at the end this time, because each of those multimillionaires so clearly delivered at his job, and because the Yankees won. They will never be populist heroes, but this time it was O.K. to like them.
Huh? Doesn't the fact that their highly paid superstars produced make it less fair? Doesn't this just reinforce the reality that the Yankees have a huge economic advantage over almost every team in baseball? That, in essence, they are just outbidding the other clubs for championships? This seems like more of a reason to dislike them to me.
More from the article.
General Manager Brian Cashman, so often second-guessed by the Tampa front office and badgered at his work by the overbearing but now ancient and ailing George Steinbrenner, was the Michelangelo of this club...
The Michelangelo? Really? Yes, only the mind's eye of a true artist could have foreseen the beauty in adding Sabathia, Teixeira, and Burnett to a roster (not to mention readding A-Rod, for nearly $30 million a season, a year prior). No other GM in the league, nor any semi-coherent baseball fan in the country, could have imagined that bringing these pieces together would result in a good team. Cashman has the gift. Or he's a beneficiary of a broken system in which his team is one of about three or four that can afford to sign the best of the best free agents, and have money left over for quality second tier guys like Burnett. Sadly, this is what MLB has become. It's a league for the rich. There will always be a sprinkling of poorer teams with sharp management or good fortune that have a nice run with a nucleus of young talent, still under team control (late 90s - early 00s A's, '03 Marlins, '07 Rays, current Twins), and there will always be down years for the fatcats ('08 Yankees, '09 Mets), but for the most part it's going to be Yankees et al., year in and year out. That's just the way baseball is right now. That the "cries of unfairness and fresh tropes about the unlevel playing field" seem fainter now is probably because baseball fans are gradually resigning themselves to this fact.
In baseball news, the MVP and Cy Young award voters did a good job this year. All four winners (Joe Mauer, Albert Pujols, Zack Greinke, and Tim Lincecum) were worthy of their awards. Historically voters have been known to overvalue things that are not great indicators of an individual's worth to his team, like team victories, stolen bases, and RBIs for a batter, and wins for a pitcher. This year they got it right, especially with Greinke, who was clearly the best pitcher in baseball last season, despite having just 16 wins (the fewest of any starting pitcher to ever win the AL Cy Young award during a non-strike shortened year).
In other baseball news, in this week's The New Yorker, there is an article chronicling the Yankees World Series-winning season by Roger Angell titled "Daddies Win: can we love the Yankees now?". (I can't find a link on-line. It's in the Nov. 30, 2009 issue.) It's one of the more annoying pieces I have read in a while. It's seven pages of the author performing literary fellatio on the Yankees. (Although, in a periodical named after a person from New York, what does one expect?) The article highlights, glorifies even, everything people outside of the Big Apple hate about the Yankees. Here's an excerpt.
While the roses are going around, we should revisit those free-agent signings of C. C. Sabathia, Mark Teixeira, and A. J. Burnett last winter, whose combined contracts cost the Yankees an extra $432.5 million, and accounted for $52 million out of the team's salary total of $201 million for 2009. (The next nearest is the Mets $135 million, and the farthest is the Marlins $36 million.) Cries of unfairness and fresh tropes about the unlevel playing field, so ferocious in March, seemed fainter at the end this time, because each of those multimillionaires so clearly delivered at his job, and because the Yankees won. They will never be populist heroes, but this time it was O.K. to like them.
Huh? Doesn't the fact that their highly paid superstars produced make it less fair? Doesn't this just reinforce the reality that the Yankees have a huge economic advantage over almost every team in baseball? That, in essence, they are just outbidding the other clubs for championships? This seems like more of a reason to dislike them to me.
More from the article.
General Manager Brian Cashman, so often second-guessed by the Tampa front office and badgered at his work by the overbearing but now ancient and ailing George Steinbrenner, was the Michelangelo of this club...
The Michelangelo? Really? Yes, only the mind's eye of a true artist could have foreseen the beauty in adding Sabathia, Teixeira, and Burnett to a roster (not to mention readding A-Rod, for nearly $30 million a season, a year prior). No other GM in the league, nor any semi-coherent baseball fan in the country, could have imagined that bringing these pieces together would result in a good team. Cashman has the gift. Or he's a beneficiary of a broken system in which his team is one of about three or four that can afford to sign the best of the best free agents, and have money left over for quality second tier guys like Burnett. Sadly, this is what MLB has become. It's a league for the rich. There will always be a sprinkling of poorer teams with sharp management or good fortune that have a nice run with a nucleus of young talent, still under team control (late 90s - early 00s A's, '03 Marlins, '07 Rays, current Twins), and there will always be down years for the fatcats ('08 Yankees, '09 Mets), but for the most part it's going to be Yankees et al., year in and year out. That's just the way baseball is right now. That the "cries of unfairness and fresh tropes about the unlevel playing field" seem fainter now is probably because baseball fans are gradually resigning themselves to this fact.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Idiocy? You be the Judge
Clark Judge of cbssports.com offers a prime example of arriving at a probably correct conclusion with moronic reasoning. I'll use Ski's convention below: normal text is from the article, bolded text is mine. I've taken the liberty of excerpting; click the link above for the whole article.
Sorry, Colts/Saints fans ... Super Bowl highly unlikely
by Clark Judge
There are no better teams today than New Orleans and Indianapolis, so, naturally, the expectation is that they meet in the Super Bowl. Only I'm here to tell you they won't. One of them won't make it, and maybe neither gets that far.
Oh, yeah? Well, that's just like, your opinion, man.
That is not an opinion.
Ok, you got me. "Prediction" is probably more appropriate.
It's a history lesson
Um, no. There's no reasonable interpretation of the term "history lesson" for which the above qualifies.
and if you're skeptical, go back to this time last season when the best two teams were Tennessee and the New York Giants. The Titans were unbeaten. The Giants had lost once. Both were slam dunks to breeze through the playoffs, yet neither did. In fact, both bowed out after one game.
Yeah, that´s convincing. If there's one thing I've learned about sports in general and the NFL in particular, it's that things always unfold the exact same way from season to season.
An aberration? Hardly. Teams that are white-hot at midseason often lose that momentum as the season winds down, and for good reason: It's difficult, if not near-impossible, to maintain a peak level of performance -- as well as to avoid key injuries -- for four months. The season is simply too long.
Ugh, where to start? First, we've got a variation of the gambler's fallacy here. The fact that Indy and New Orleans have already been playing extremely well for two months is used as evidence that they're "due" to get cold. Second, they don't have to maintain a peak level of performance for another two months to get to Super Bowl. It's very likely that both teams will receive a first-round bye, even if they falter a little bit, so all they have to do is perform well enough (or get lucky enough) to win two games in January.
The 2007 New England team would seem to contradict that idea, only the way I see it they reinforced it. Yes, they won all 16 regular-season games, but look what happened down the stretch: They could have been beaten by Philadelphia. They should've lost to Baltimore. They should've lost to the New York Giants in the regular-season finale.
So, he's could'ved and should'ved his way into arguing that the Patriots started out white-hot, but actually lost that vital momentum going into the playoffs, while ignoring the Pats' three wins in weeks 14-16 by a combined total of 52 points. But let's accept that the virtually 13-3 Patriots stumbled their way into the playoffs. History shows us that teams that start 9-0 can't make the Super Bowl, right?
And they were taken to the wire in the AFC Championship Game by a San Diego team operating without Antonio Gates and LaDainian Tomlinson and with quarterback Philip Rivers playing on one leg.
Oh, another win in score only. Never mind that this time, San Diego never got closer than 9 points with 12 minutes or less left in the game. If Rivers had grown another leg, the Chargers would have won.
In short, they wound down as the stakes went up. So when they reached the Super Bowl they were beaten by a Giants team that, until a Dec. 23 defeat of Buffalo, wasn't sure it would qualify for the playoffs.
Since the Super Bowl was at least as close, and the Giants caught at least as many breaks as the Patriots did in any of their virtual losses, can't say the Patriots were the "should've been" champs?
My point is this: Don't get dazzled by what's going on nine games into the season. Yeah, it's terrific that Indianapolis and New Orleans haven't lost, and, no, I don't see anyone out there that is superior. But I also know there are seven weeks left in the regular season, and that's a long, long time to maintain breakneck speed.
Well, again, they don't have to "maintain breakneck speed" for the next seven weeks to reach the Super Bowl. They just have to be mediocre at worst over that stretch, then win two games in January.
Besides, I'm not sure you want to maintain anything going into the playoffs. You want clubs that improve weekly. You look for teams that catch fire in the second half, start building momentum, gain confidence and take their game to the next level for the playoffs.
Right, let's rule out the Colts and Saints, because it's impossible for them to "catch fire in the second half", given that they're already on fire. Never mind that their second halves may be just as convincing as any other teams' (hard to know given that the second half of the season has barely started).
San Diego GM A.J. Smith always says the key to any season is reaching the playoffs because anything is possible after that.
And yet, the Saints and Colts have both already all but clinched playoff spots, but it's not possible for both of them to make the Super Bowl?
And he's right. Tennessee struggled down the stretch last season, splitting their last six games. The Giants floundered, losing three of their last four. So when the second season started it really didn't matter that both clubs held home-field advantages; what mattered was that their play ... and, probably, their confidence ... had declined.
See my first remark.
That's why I urge you to start paying attention to teams that are beginning to build something -- someone, say, like Arizona or Cincinnati. They're good, they're dangerous and they're hot. So are Indianapolis and New Orleans. But how can they stay hot for five months?
Gambler's fallacy again. Also, let's look at Cincinatti. They're 7-1 since a fluky loss at Denver week one, including two wins over each Pittsburgh and Baltimore. Aren't they only slightly less "hot" than New Orleans and Indy. Should we really be higher on their chances just because they managed to drop a home game to Texas in that stretch?
I mean, everyone is supposed to peak for the playoffs, right? But when you win early and keep winning, how do you suddenly peak when you've been doing it for four long and exhausting months?
Well, you wouldn't be "peaking", you'd be maintaining then. Oh, yeah, I forgot, for some reason maintaining is bad. Yeah, sustained success for four months is usually an indicator of an inability to maintain that success.
Often, teams don't, and the 2008 Titans are proof. So are the 2005 Indianapolis Colts. They won their first 13, then couldn't beat Pittsburgh in the playoffs. The 2003 Kansas City Chiefs will take their place in line behind them. They won their first nine, then couldn't beat Indianapolis in the playoffs.
Three anecdotes are certainly enough to convince me. But, wait, what about about the '72 Dolphins, '85 Bears, '90 Giants, '91 Redskins and '06 Colts. They all started 9-0, and not only made the Super Bowl, but won it. Now, if I worked at CBS and had a few lackeys under me, I would actually have them calculate what percentage of 9-0 teams have gone on to play in the Super Bowl. But being a lone blogger, I'll content myself with fighting anecdote with anecdote. I have more, so I win.
(Interestingly, the '06 Colts finished the season 3-4, and lacked that vital momentum going into the playoffs. Some of those losses must have been virtual wins.)
"This is a game of confidence and momentum," said Carolina GM Marty Hurney, "whether it's teams or whether it's individual players. It's a game of confidence and momentum, and the teams that are hot at the end historically are the teams that do well in the playoffs."
Notice he didn't say the teams that are hot in September and October.
Yeah, why look at statistical evidence when you can quote a GM? And, of course, a team that is hot in September and October can't be hot at the end, because it's not possible to stay hot that long, and even if a team did, they would be maintaining and not peaking, or something.
By winning now, they can gain home-field advantage for the playoffs, and that is big. But it is not crucial. Only nine of the top 20 seeds in the past 10 years have made it to the Super Bowl, or 45 percent.
A little confusing, but I'm going to assume he meant to say "twenty top conference seeds". In that case, each top seed would need to win two games to advance to the Super Bowl. If the games were coin flips, we would expect about 25% of the top seeds to advance. I'm not sure "only" is the appropriate word here.
So there's a lesson there, and the lesson is this: While New Orleans and Indianapolis are good --- and I mean real good -- they may not be good enough to maintain their torrid paces. The last time the top two seeds entering the playoffs went to the Super Bowl it was 1993, and each had four losses. So there's a history of good teams going bad in the playoffs, and there's a history of top seeds going south. I like the Saints, and I like the Colts, and I like them a lot. But I like them now. One of them will not survive this grind, and it's not something I see in either club that tells me. It's something I see in the league's history.
Yes, it is likely that at least one of these teams fails to make the Super Bowl. The reason has nothing to do with "momentum" or "peaking", however. The reason is that to advance, each will have to beat two very good teams, and there's just not that much difference between very good and great teams in the NFL. If both the Colts and Saints have, say, a 60% chance to win each of their games (making them significant, but not overwhelming favorites), there is about a 13% chance of them meeting in the Super Bowl. But if someone offered me a million dollars if I could pick the Super Bowl participants today, I'd pick Saints-Colts in a heartbeat. It's not that likely, but it's more likely than any other possibility. The thing is, there are just a ton of possibilities. Even when the playoff field is set, there will be 36 possible matchups. Writing an article disparaging the chances of one of those possibilities is a fatuous waste of words.
Sorry, Colts/Saints fans ... Super Bowl highly unlikely
by Clark Judge
There are no better teams today than New Orleans and Indianapolis, so, naturally, the expectation is that they meet in the Super Bowl. Only I'm here to tell you they won't. One of them won't make it, and maybe neither gets that far.
Oh, yeah? Well, that's just like, your opinion, man.
That is not an opinion.
Ok, you got me. "Prediction" is probably more appropriate.
It's a history lesson
Um, no. There's no reasonable interpretation of the term "history lesson" for which the above qualifies.
and if you're skeptical, go back to this time last season when the best two teams were Tennessee and the New York Giants. The Titans were unbeaten. The Giants had lost once. Both were slam dunks to breeze through the playoffs, yet neither did. In fact, both bowed out after one game.
Yeah, that´s convincing. If there's one thing I've learned about sports in general and the NFL in particular, it's that things always unfold the exact same way from season to season.
An aberration? Hardly. Teams that are white-hot at midseason often lose that momentum as the season winds down, and for good reason: It's difficult, if not near-impossible, to maintain a peak level of performance -- as well as to avoid key injuries -- for four months. The season is simply too long.
Ugh, where to start? First, we've got a variation of the gambler's fallacy here. The fact that Indy and New Orleans have already been playing extremely well for two months is used as evidence that they're "due" to get cold. Second, they don't have to maintain a peak level of performance for another two months to get to Super Bowl. It's very likely that both teams will receive a first-round bye, even if they falter a little bit, so all they have to do is perform well enough (or get lucky enough) to win two games in January.
The 2007 New England team would seem to contradict that idea, only the way I see it they reinforced it. Yes, they won all 16 regular-season games, but look what happened down the stretch: They could have been beaten by Philadelphia. They should've lost to Baltimore. They should've lost to the New York Giants in the regular-season finale.
So, he's could'ved and should'ved his way into arguing that the Patriots started out white-hot, but actually lost that vital momentum going into the playoffs, while ignoring the Pats' three wins in weeks 14-16 by a combined total of 52 points. But let's accept that the virtually 13-3 Patriots stumbled their way into the playoffs. History shows us that teams that start 9-0 can't make the Super Bowl, right?
And they were taken to the wire in the AFC Championship Game by a San Diego team operating without Antonio Gates and LaDainian Tomlinson and with quarterback Philip Rivers playing on one leg.
Oh, another win in score only. Never mind that this time, San Diego never got closer than 9 points with 12 minutes or less left in the game. If Rivers had grown another leg, the Chargers would have won.
In short, they wound down as the stakes went up. So when they reached the Super Bowl they were beaten by a Giants team that, until a Dec. 23 defeat of Buffalo, wasn't sure it would qualify for the playoffs.
Since the Super Bowl was at least as close, and the Giants caught at least as many breaks as the Patriots did in any of their virtual losses, can't say the Patriots were the "should've been" champs?
My point is this: Don't get dazzled by what's going on nine games into the season. Yeah, it's terrific that Indianapolis and New Orleans haven't lost, and, no, I don't see anyone out there that is superior. But I also know there are seven weeks left in the regular season, and that's a long, long time to maintain breakneck speed.
Well, again, they don't have to "maintain breakneck speed" for the next seven weeks to reach the Super Bowl. They just have to be mediocre at worst over that stretch, then win two games in January.
Besides, I'm not sure you want to maintain anything going into the playoffs. You want clubs that improve weekly. You look for teams that catch fire in the second half, start building momentum, gain confidence and take their game to the next level for the playoffs.
Right, let's rule out the Colts and Saints, because it's impossible for them to "catch fire in the second half", given that they're already on fire. Never mind that their second halves may be just as convincing as any other teams' (hard to know given that the second half of the season has barely started).
San Diego GM A.J. Smith always says the key to any season is reaching the playoffs because anything is possible after that.
And yet, the Saints and Colts have both already all but clinched playoff spots, but it's not possible for both of them to make the Super Bowl?
And he's right. Tennessee struggled down the stretch last season, splitting their last six games. The Giants floundered, losing three of their last four. So when the second season started it really didn't matter that both clubs held home-field advantages; what mattered was that their play ... and, probably, their confidence ... had declined.
See my first remark.
That's why I urge you to start paying attention to teams that are beginning to build something -- someone, say, like Arizona or Cincinnati. They're good, they're dangerous and they're hot. So are Indianapolis and New Orleans. But how can they stay hot for five months?
Gambler's fallacy again. Also, let's look at Cincinatti. They're 7-1 since a fluky loss at Denver week one, including two wins over each Pittsburgh and Baltimore. Aren't they only slightly less "hot" than New Orleans and Indy. Should we really be higher on their chances just because they managed to drop a home game to Texas in that stretch?
I mean, everyone is supposed to peak for the playoffs, right? But when you win early and keep winning, how do you suddenly peak when you've been doing it for four long and exhausting months?
Well, you wouldn't be "peaking", you'd be maintaining then. Oh, yeah, I forgot, for some reason maintaining is bad. Yeah, sustained success for four months is usually an indicator of an inability to maintain that success.
Often, teams don't, and the 2008 Titans are proof. So are the 2005 Indianapolis Colts. They won their first 13, then couldn't beat Pittsburgh in the playoffs. The 2003 Kansas City Chiefs will take their place in line behind them. They won their first nine, then couldn't beat Indianapolis in the playoffs.
Three anecdotes are certainly enough to convince me. But, wait, what about about the '72 Dolphins, '85 Bears, '90 Giants, '91 Redskins and '06 Colts. They all started 9-0, and not only made the Super Bowl, but won it. Now, if I worked at CBS and had a few lackeys under me, I would actually have them calculate what percentage of 9-0 teams have gone on to play in the Super Bowl. But being a lone blogger, I'll content myself with fighting anecdote with anecdote. I have more, so I win.
(Interestingly, the '06 Colts finished the season 3-4, and lacked that vital momentum going into the playoffs. Some of those losses must have been virtual wins.)
"This is a game of confidence and momentum," said Carolina GM Marty Hurney, "whether it's teams or whether it's individual players. It's a game of confidence and momentum, and the teams that are hot at the end historically are the teams that do well in the playoffs."
Notice he didn't say the teams that are hot in September and October.
Yeah, why look at statistical evidence when you can quote a GM? And, of course, a team that is hot in September and October can't be hot at the end, because it's not possible to stay hot that long, and even if a team did, they would be maintaining and not peaking, or something.
By winning now, they can gain home-field advantage for the playoffs, and that is big. But it is not crucial. Only nine of the top 20 seeds in the past 10 years have made it to the Super Bowl, or 45 percent.
A little confusing, but I'm going to assume he meant to say "twenty top conference seeds". In that case, each top seed would need to win two games to advance to the Super Bowl. If the games were coin flips, we would expect about 25% of the top seeds to advance. I'm not sure "only" is the appropriate word here.
So there's a lesson there, and the lesson is this: While New Orleans and Indianapolis are good --- and I mean real good -- they may not be good enough to maintain their torrid paces. The last time the top two seeds entering the playoffs went to the Super Bowl it was 1993, and each had four losses. So there's a history of good teams going bad in the playoffs, and there's a history of top seeds going south. I like the Saints, and I like the Colts, and I like them a lot. But I like them now. One of them will not survive this grind, and it's not something I see in either club that tells me. It's something I see in the league's history.
Yes, it is likely that at least one of these teams fails to make the Super Bowl. The reason has nothing to do with "momentum" or "peaking", however. The reason is that to advance, each will have to beat two very good teams, and there's just not that much difference between very good and great teams in the NFL. If both the Colts and Saints have, say, a 60% chance to win each of their games (making them significant, but not overwhelming favorites), there is about a 13% chance of them meeting in the Super Bowl. But if someone offered me a million dollars if I could pick the Super Bowl participants today, I'd pick Saints-Colts in a heartbeat. It's not that likely, but it's more likely than any other possibility. The thing is, there are just a ton of possibilities. Even when the playoff field is set, there will be 36 possible matchups. Writing an article disparaging the chances of one of those possibilities is a fatuous waste of words.
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Another from the Flem File
I was not planning to put up another post this week, but I saw this gem from David Fleming and could not resist. (Like before, the bold comments are mine.)
Bill Belichick Enters Another Elite Club
By David Fleming
Belichick’s career win/loss percentage: .626. Switzer’s career win/loss percentage: .633. So, they are pretty comparable there.
But that's exactly what's happening Monday after Belichick's rather odd, and uncharacteristically panicky, decision to go for it on fourth down deep in his own territory cost the Patriots a win in Indy Sunday night.
I’m not sure what was particularly panicky about it. A pointless quote might help clear things up.
Norm Chow, the offensive coordinator for UCLA, once told me: "Anybody can just say, 'Hey, let's go for it!' But real coaches get a feel for the game, their own team and the situation and they just know, instinctively, when it's the right time to take a risk."
There we go. Fleming is usually good for at least two pointless quotes per article, so I’m expecting another one. Also, I like that his authority is an assistant coach of a college team that is 5-11 in conference during his tenure.
Look, Bill Belichick is, maybe, the best coach ever in the NFL. In fact, currently, I'm not even sure there's a close second. But last night in Indy those all-important instincts that Chow was talking about? Yeah, they abandoned Belichick, big-time, instead revealing something none of us had ever seen before: his human side. Yes, on a better day Belichick probably would have sensed slight vibrations coming from Kevin Faulk’s twitching finger tips, indicating that Faulk would slightly bobble a pass thrown him, causing him to establish possession of the ball only after being driven behind the yard to gain by a defender, thus causing a turn over on downs. On a better day. Caught up in the moment, intimidated (yes, I said it) by Peyton Manning, Belichick got tunnel vision and decided, above all, he wanted to control his own destiny and keep the ball away from the Colts.
Now let me say the same thing Fleming just said, but make it sound like Belichick made the right call. “Focused on the decision at hand, fearing what might happen if the league-MVP Peyton Manning got the ball back, Belichick, always with the singular goal of winning the game in mind, decided his best move was to give his vaunted offense a chance to convert, and try to keep the ball away from the Colts.”
Bill made a boo-boo. Maybe, maybe not. A big one. Definitely not. And when you expect absolute perfection from everyone around you at all times, well, the moment you mess up you're gonna get crushed for it. And that's what's happening today. Rodney Harrison, in fact, immediately called it the worst coaching decision he had ever seen Belichick make. One thing that bothers me about football (and most other sports) is that former players are automatically assumed to be authorities on all aspects of the game. Being able to run fast and hit hard does not qualify somebody as an expert in the tactical nuances of a football game. It just doesn’t. Which tells me one thing: Rodney must have forgotten about Bill's tenure in Cleveland when he was the original version of Eric Mangini. (True story: I interviewed Belichick once under the stands at old Cleveland Municipal Stadium when most of his answers were drowned out by chants of "BILL MUST GO! BILL MUST GO!" Imagine that.)
What does this have to do with anything? Maybe Fleming is trying something new. He’s getting away from the irrelevant quote, and trying out the irrelevant anecdote. Is this going to become a trend?
"We push players beyond their limits and expectations every day," Jeff Fisher told me a few seasons ago. "Sometimes, as coaches we just have to remember to do that with our decisions too."
Nope.
As Fisher likes to say, it's not about minimizing risk -- it's about managing it.
What does this mean? It must just be more nonsense for good measure.
Here are a few other coaches who learned the hard way, that's a whole lot easier said than done:
You’ll have to read the rest of this scintillating article on your own. I’m done.
Bill Belichick Enters Another Elite Club
By David Fleming
Belichick’s career win/loss percentage: .626. Switzer’s career win/loss percentage: .633. So, they are pretty comparable there.
But that's exactly what's happening Monday after Belichick's rather odd, and uncharacteristically panicky, decision to go for it on fourth down deep in his own territory cost the Patriots a win in Indy Sunday night.
I’m not sure what was particularly panicky about it. A pointless quote might help clear things up.
Norm Chow, the offensive coordinator for UCLA, once told me: "Anybody can just say, 'Hey, let's go for it!' But real coaches get a feel for the game, their own team and the situation and they just know, instinctively, when it's the right time to take a risk."
There we go. Fleming is usually good for at least two pointless quotes per article, so I’m expecting another one. Also, I like that his authority is an assistant coach of a college team that is 5-11 in conference during his tenure.
Look, Bill Belichick is, maybe, the best coach ever in the NFL. In fact, currently, I'm not even sure there's a close second. But last night in Indy those all-important instincts that Chow was talking about? Yeah, they abandoned Belichick, big-time, instead revealing something none of us had ever seen before: his human side. Yes, on a better day Belichick probably would have sensed slight vibrations coming from Kevin Faulk’s twitching finger tips, indicating that Faulk would slightly bobble a pass thrown him, causing him to establish possession of the ball only after being driven behind the yard to gain by a defender, thus causing a turn over on downs. On a better day. Caught up in the moment, intimidated (yes, I said it) by Peyton Manning, Belichick got tunnel vision and decided, above all, he wanted to control his own destiny and keep the ball away from the Colts.
Now let me say the same thing Fleming just said, but make it sound like Belichick made the right call. “Focused on the decision at hand, fearing what might happen if the league-MVP Peyton Manning got the ball back, Belichick, always with the singular goal of winning the game in mind, decided his best move was to give his vaunted offense a chance to convert, and try to keep the ball away from the Colts.”
Bill made a boo-boo. Maybe, maybe not. A big one. Definitely not. And when you expect absolute perfection from everyone around you at all times, well, the moment you mess up you're gonna get crushed for it. And that's what's happening today. Rodney Harrison, in fact, immediately called it the worst coaching decision he had ever seen Belichick make. One thing that bothers me about football (and most other sports) is that former players are automatically assumed to be authorities on all aspects of the game. Being able to run fast and hit hard does not qualify somebody as an expert in the tactical nuances of a football game. It just doesn’t. Which tells me one thing: Rodney must have forgotten about Bill's tenure in Cleveland when he was the original version of Eric Mangini. (True story: I interviewed Belichick once under the stands at old Cleveland Municipal Stadium when most of his answers were drowned out by chants of "BILL MUST GO! BILL MUST GO!" Imagine that.)
What does this have to do with anything? Maybe Fleming is trying something new. He’s getting away from the irrelevant quote, and trying out the irrelevant anecdote. Is this going to become a trend?
"We push players beyond their limits and expectations every day," Jeff Fisher told me a few seasons ago. "Sometimes, as coaches we just have to remember to do that with our decisions too."
Nope.
As Fisher likes to say, it's not about minimizing risk -- it's about managing it.
What does this mean? It must just be more nonsense for good measure.
Here are a few other coaches who learned the hard way, that's a whole lot easier said than done:
You’ll have to read the rest of this scintillating article on your own. I’m done.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
More on the Belichick Call (with a little TMQ tossed in)
In today's TMQ, he links to this article which makes the case that Belichick did the right thing in going for it. Although, in the article's analysis it's little more than a coin toss (a win probability of 80.5% by going for it versus a win probability of 79% by punting), and you could take issue with some of their assumputions, such as using probabilities with respect to average offenses, when both the Pats and Colts have above average offenses, but I think it's safe to say that it was a really close call, and it's tough to fault Belichick in either decision he makes.
TMQ takes Belichick's side to a fault. Here is my favorite blurb from his article.
Belichick correctly calculated that if he punted, the hot Indianapolis offense was likely to beat his tired defense...
Paragraphs earlier he cited an article estimating that Indianapolis' chances of winning after a Patriot punt is 21%, and now he implies that Indianapolis is likely to win in this scenario! WTF, TMQ?
TMQ takes Belichick's side to a fault. Here is my favorite blurb from his article.
Belichick correctly calculated that if he punted, the hot Indianapolis offense was likely to beat his tired defense...
Paragraphs earlier he cited an article estimating that Indianapolis' chances of winning after a Patriot punt is 21%, and now he implies that Indianapolis is likely to win in this scenario! WTF, TMQ?
Monday, November 16, 2009
Did MJD Make the Right Call?
Bill Belichick was not the only one making unconventional moves on Sunday. With a little over 1:30 left in the Jaguars/Jets game, Jags running back Maurice Jones-Drew took a knee on the Jets 1 yard line instead of scoring. His team was down 21-22 to the Jets at the time, and the Jets had no timeouts left. On PTI today, Tony Kornheiser said it was the wrong move. I believe he even called it "crazy". (His rationale was that the Jags were behind at the time, so they have to take the points.) So, did MJD make right move? My educated guess: an emphatic "absolutely".
By taking a knee, MJD put everything on one kick for the Jags: make it you win, miss it you lose. The kick was essentially an extra point (one yard shorter, in fact). The career conversion percentage of Jags kicker Josh Scobee on extra points: 98.3%. So, MJD almost guaranteed victory by taking a knee. If he scores a touchdown, the Jets have enough time to counter with a touchdown of their own. It is unlikely the Jets can pull it off -- there is only 1:30 left and they have no timeouts -- but I'm gonna go ahead and say it's not even close to 1.7% unlikely. It's probably closer to five, maybe even ten times this. That's the point here. There is Decision A and Decision B. Decision A wins more often than Decision B, so it's the right move. End of. I really don't see how anybody who watches a fair amount of football, let alone hosts a show in which it is featured, could think MJD made a crazy move.
By taking a knee, MJD put everything on one kick for the Jags: make it you win, miss it you lose. The kick was essentially an extra point (one yard shorter, in fact). The career conversion percentage of Jags kicker Josh Scobee on extra points: 98.3%. So, MJD almost guaranteed victory by taking a knee. If he scores a touchdown, the Jets have enough time to counter with a touchdown of their own. It is unlikely the Jets can pull it off -- there is only 1:30 left and they have no timeouts -- but I'm gonna go ahead and say it's not even close to 1.7% unlikely. It's probably closer to five, maybe even ten times this. That's the point here. There is Decision A and Decision B. Decision A wins more often than Decision B, so it's the right move. End of. I really don't see how anybody who watches a fair amount of football, let alone hosts a show in which it is featured, could think MJD made a crazy move.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Did Bill Belichick Make the Right Move?
In one of the most entertaining football games I have seen in a while, Bill Belichick made a very unconventional move. He elected to go for it from his own 28 with 2:08 left in the game and his Patriots leading the Colts 34-28. The attempt failed and the Colts went on to score a touchdown and win the game by a point. Belichick is probably the only coach in the league with the balls to go for it in that situation. The second-guessing is going to be relentless. So, was it the right move? My educated guess: an emphatic "probably not... but then again...".
Let's say a) going for it is a 55-45 proposition in favor of converting, b) converting means a win, c) a punt means Indy gets the ball on their own 30, d) not converting gives the Colts the ball on the Pats 30.* Under these conditions, going for it is the right move if the Colts scoring a touchdown, with two minutes left and one time out, from the Pats 30 is less than 2.2 times as likely as scoring a touchdown from their own 30 under similar circumstances. Is this the case? I don't think so, but who knows? In order to answer this with confidence I would need much more time and data than I have currently. My off-the-cuff expert estimation (watching just about every NFL game of the season qualifies me as an expert, in my mind) is that punting is the right move, but if Belichick felt his defense was particularly beaten down, or that his offense is exceptionally good at picking up two yards, then going for it might have been a good move.
This situation is precisely the time when a "Game Management Coach" could come in handy. NFL teams should hire people to crunch a bunch of data, so that they have good estimations of probabilities for a swath of scenarios. They should then pick the one who is the fastest on his or her feet and proclaim them the Game Management Coach. Their job is to follow the head coach around and tell him what to do. It is a great idea, but the chances of it happening anytime soon are probably pretty low. (By the way, this is the same basic idea put forth by Bill Simmons in this column's "Great Call of the Week". Although I disagree with his take on the "down by two scores in the final two minutes" conundrum. I also don't think Madden is the best NFL football game simulator, given that I once threw 8 TD passes to Terrell Owens in a game against a friend. Still, the larger point is a good one.)
*These seem reasonble because a) two yards is what is needed on a 2-point conversion and the success rate for them has been around 50% in recent years (this guy backs that up), but the Patriots have an above average offense, so I put it at 55%, b) the Pats can essentially run out the clock if they convert, c) a 42 yard net punt is reasonable, d) the 30 is a good round yard line.
Let's say a) going for it is a 55-45 proposition in favor of converting, b) converting means a win, c) a punt means Indy gets the ball on their own 30, d) not converting gives the Colts the ball on the Pats 30.* Under these conditions, going for it is the right move if the Colts scoring a touchdown, with two minutes left and one time out, from the Pats 30 is less than 2.2 times as likely as scoring a touchdown from their own 30 under similar circumstances. Is this the case? I don't think so, but who knows? In order to answer this with confidence I would need much more time and data than I have currently. My off-the-cuff expert estimation (watching just about every NFL game of the season qualifies me as an expert, in my mind) is that punting is the right move, but if Belichick felt his defense was particularly beaten down, or that his offense is exceptionally good at picking up two yards, then going for it might have been a good move.
This situation is precisely the time when a "Game Management Coach" could come in handy. NFL teams should hire people to crunch a bunch of data, so that they have good estimations of probabilities for a swath of scenarios. They should then pick the one who is the fastest on his or her feet and proclaim them the Game Management Coach. Their job is to follow the head coach around and tell him what to do. It is a great idea, but the chances of it happening anytime soon are probably pretty low. (By the way, this is the same basic idea put forth by Bill Simmons in this column's "Great Call of the Week". Although I disagree with his take on the "down by two scores in the final two minutes" conundrum. I also don't think Madden is the best NFL football game simulator, given that I once threw 8 TD passes to Terrell Owens in a game against a friend. Still, the larger point is a good one.)
*These seem reasonble because a) two yards is what is needed on a 2-point conversion and the success rate for them has been around 50% in recent years (this guy backs that up), but the Patriots have an above average offense, so I put it at 55%, b) the Pats can essentially run out the clock if they convert, c) a 42 yard net punt is reasonable, d) the 30 is a good round yard line.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
TMQ's Asinine Take on the Compensation of College Athletes
Below is an excerpt from this week's TMQ column concerning the compensation of college basketball players.
Last winter, Richard Vedder of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity, what we call in Washington a "boutique" think tank (it's really small), argued in the Wall Street Journal that college sports stars "receive compensation that amounts to only a very small percentage of what they would have earned if they sold their services in a competitive market." Vedder noted that Kevin Durant got about $33,000 in "compensation," in the form of tuition and expenses, in his year at the University of Texas, then jumped to $3.5 million a year when he entered the NBA. Colleges are keeping the money that basketball stars generated, Vedder contends, and therefore college athletes should form unions and demand pay.
Many, including TMQ reader Nasr Abdul-Mujeeb of Detroit, also think Division I football and men's basketball players should be paid: "The NCAA is using a free-labor system that lines the pockets of coaches, ADs and NCAA administrators, but provides little benefit to players, many of whom don't get a college education anyway." (Under "one and done," a college basketball player can attend classes in the fall, and then pay much less attention to classes in the spring, continuing to perform for that college while maintaining eligibility based on fall credits.) Surely if one considers only star players such a [Kevin] Durant, the NCAA is indeed benefiting from a free-labor system. But is that the way we should look at matters?
The basic argument for exploitation goes something like this. If a big name college basketball program had to pay their players, how much would they pay per year for a full squad? Is it safe to say $1.4 million? I think that's an underestimate, probably even a ridiculous underestimate, considering how much schools are willing to pay their coaches ($1.2 million per year for the power conference teams in the 2008 NCAA tournament) , not too mention how much competitive bidding for talent would drive up player compensation. Even using the modest estimate of $1.4 million per year, that's double what colleges pay their players now, assuming $40,000 (to be conservative I use this figure instead of TMQ's $33,000) per player per year. For better or worse, colleges are almost certainly paying their players a very small fraction of what they would be making under a free market. Players are getting a small slice of a big pie that they largely baked. To many, this is exploitation. If college players were paid market value, Kevin Durant probably would not have to "donate" scholarships to other players. They would be earning them outright, and then some.
*This is truly an asinine notion. Each year, there are hundreds of good college basketball players, who are key parts on good teams, who help draw fans and bring in money, that never crack the NBA. Why should their scholarships be considered donated?
Last winter, Richard Vedder of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity, what we call in Washington a "boutique" think tank (it's really small), argued in the Wall Street Journal that college sports stars "receive compensation that amounts to only a very small percentage of what they would have earned if they sold their services in a competitive market." Vedder noted that Kevin Durant got about $33,000 in "compensation," in the form of tuition and expenses, in his year at the University of Texas, then jumped to $3.5 million a year when he entered the NBA. Colleges are keeping the money that basketball stars generated, Vedder contends, and therefore college athletes should form unions and demand pay.
Many, including TMQ reader Nasr Abdul-Mujeeb of Detroit, also think Division I football and men's basketball players should be paid: "The NCAA is using a free-labor system that lines the pockets of coaches, ADs and NCAA administrators, but provides little benefit to players, many of whom don't get a college education anyway." (Under "one and done," a college basketball player can attend classes in the fall, and then pay much less attention to classes in the spring, continuing to perform for that college while maintaining eligibility based on fall credits.) Surely if one considers only star players such a [Kevin] Durant, the NCAA is indeed benefiting from a free-labor system. But is that the way we should look at matters?
During Durant's college season, 2006-07, there were 343 Division I men's basketball teams, each awarding 13 full scholarships, and 270 Division II basketball teams, each awarding 10 full scholarships, for a total of 7,159 men's basketball scholarships. (The numbers are now slightly different.) The following season, Durant's rookie year, there were 55 NBA players who had just left college, either early or as seniors. Since 55 from that college season advanced to the NBA, we can roughly judge that 55 of the 7,159 major-program basketball players that year were being exploited financially, while the other 7,104 were not. The other 7,104 players were coming out way ahead financially, as they were receiving free college educations -- if they had enough sense to go to class -- plus experiences that might help them in later life, especially in the business world. ("Wow, you played basketball at Boston College?")
Divide 7,159 by 55, and get 130. So each player from Durant's college season who might have been earning an NBA salary was supporting the college educations of another 130 players. This is the key thought missing from free-labor complaints about college basketball. Yes, the tiny fraction of players capable of advancing to the NBA do perform for far less than their market price, but they create economic value that lets large numbers of others go to college on scholarship. Assume the typical basketball scholarship is worth $33,000, which sounds a little low. (Full cost at the University of Texas for out-of-state students is currently $40,426) Those 7,159 scholarships are worth $236 million. So it's not pure exploitation -- $236 million is going to the players who make the college basketball system possible. It's up to those players to have the good sense to attend class and study -- what you accomplish in life is ultimately always up to you. But the scholarships created by the "free" play of NBA-capable collegians are the key consideration. In Durant's college year, he essentially donated 130 scholarships to other basketball players, worth $4.3 million. So actually his "compensation" was more than the $3.5 million he received the following season in the NBA. It's just that the compensation was not money in his pocket, it was the admirable act of financing other people's educations.
This is an embarrassingly weak defense of the status quo. The main reason lies in the sentences I put in bold. TMQ assumes that any college player who cannot play in the NBA is not being financially exploited, and will come out "way ahead." This assumption is completely unsupported, and in my estimation probably very untrue, especially for players in the power conferences (Pac-10, Big-10, ACC, Southeastern, Big East, Big 12). Even if a college hoopster does not play in the NBA, they are still providing a service for their university, and one off of which the university often makes a lot of money. They have worth to the university. (TMQ apparently disagrees, as he seems to think all scholarships are earned by future NBA players, and then "donated" to everybody else.*) I don't think it's at all appropriate to use what a college player will make in the NBA ($0 for almost all players, as TMQ points out) to establish their worth because they are not playing NBA basketball. Their worth should be determined by the college basketball market. But there is no real college basketball market, and that's exactly the point.The basic argument for exploitation goes something like this. If a big name college basketball program had to pay their players, how much would they pay per year for a full squad? Is it safe to say $1.4 million? I think that's an underestimate, probably even a ridiculous underestimate, considering how much schools are willing to pay their coaches ($1.2 million per year for the power conference teams in the 2008 NCAA tournament) , not too mention how much competitive bidding for talent would drive up player compensation. Even using the modest estimate of $1.4 million per year, that's double what colleges pay their players now, assuming $40,000 (to be conservative I use this figure instead of TMQ's $33,000) per player per year. For better or worse, colleges are almost certainly paying their players a very small fraction of what they would be making under a free market. Players are getting a small slice of a big pie that they largely baked. To many, this is exploitation. If college players were paid market value, Kevin Durant probably would not have to "donate" scholarships to other players. They would be earning them outright, and then some.
*This is truly an asinine notion. Each year, there are hundreds of good college basketball players, who are key parts on good teams, who help draw fans and bring in money, that never crack the NBA. Why should their scholarships be considered donated?
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