Bill Belichick was not the only one making unconventional moves on Sunday. With a little over 1:30 left in the Jaguars/Jets game, Jags running back Maurice Jones-Drew took a knee on the Jets 1 yard line instead of scoring. His team was down 21-22 to the Jets at the time, and the Jets had no timeouts left. On PTI today, Tony Kornheiser said it was the wrong move. I believe he even called it "crazy". (His rationale was that the Jags were behind at the time, so they have to take the points.) So, did MJD make right move? My educated guess: an emphatic "absolutely".
By taking a knee, MJD put everything on one kick for the Jags: make it you win, miss it you lose. The kick was essentially an extra point (one yard shorter, in fact). The career conversion percentage of Jags kicker Josh Scobee on extra points: 98.3%. So, MJD almost guaranteed victory by taking a knee. If he scores a touchdown, the Jets have enough time to counter with a touchdown of their own. It is unlikely the Jets can pull it off -- there is only 1:30 left and they have no timeouts -- but I'm gonna go ahead and say it's not even close to 1.7% unlikely. It's probably closer to five, maybe even ten times this. That's the point here. There is Decision A and Decision B. Decision A wins more often than Decision B, so it's the right move. End of. I really don't see how anybody who watches a fair amount of football, let alone hosts a show in which it is featured, could think MJD made a crazy move.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Did Bill Belichick Make the Right Move?
In one of the most entertaining football games I have seen in a while, Bill Belichick made a very unconventional move. He elected to go for it from his own 28 with 2:08 left in the game and his Patriots leading the Colts 34-28. The attempt failed and the Colts went on to score a touchdown and win the game by a point. Belichick is probably the only coach in the league with the balls to go for it in that situation. The second-guessing is going to be relentless. So, was it the right move? My educated guess: an emphatic "probably not... but then again...".
Let's say a) going for it is a 55-45 proposition in favor of converting, b) converting means a win, c) a punt means Indy gets the ball on their own 30, d) not converting gives the Colts the ball on the Pats 30.* Under these conditions, going for it is the right move if the Colts scoring a touchdown, with two minutes left and one time out, from the Pats 30 is less than 2.2 times as likely as scoring a touchdown from their own 30 under similar circumstances. Is this the case? I don't think so, but who knows? In order to answer this with confidence I would need much more time and data than I have currently. My off-the-cuff expert estimation (watching just about every NFL game of the season qualifies me as an expert, in my mind) is that punting is the right move, but if Belichick felt his defense was particularly beaten down, or that his offense is exceptionally good at picking up two yards, then going for it might have been a good move.
This situation is precisely the time when a "Game Management Coach" could come in handy. NFL teams should hire people to crunch a bunch of data, so that they have good estimations of probabilities for a swath of scenarios. They should then pick the one who is the fastest on his or her feet and proclaim them the Game Management Coach. Their job is to follow the head coach around and tell him what to do. It is a great idea, but the chances of it happening anytime soon are probably pretty low. (By the way, this is the same basic idea put forth by Bill Simmons in this column's "Great Call of the Week". Although I disagree with his take on the "down by two scores in the final two minutes" conundrum. I also don't think Madden is the best NFL football game simulator, given that I once threw 8 TD passes to Terrell Owens in a game against a friend. Still, the larger point is a good one.)
*These seem reasonble because a) two yards is what is needed on a 2-point conversion and the success rate for them has been around 50% in recent years (this guy backs that up), but the Patriots have an above average offense, so I put it at 55%, b) the Pats can essentially run out the clock if they convert, c) a 42 yard net punt is reasonable, d) the 30 is a good round yard line.
Let's say a) going for it is a 55-45 proposition in favor of converting, b) converting means a win, c) a punt means Indy gets the ball on their own 30, d) not converting gives the Colts the ball on the Pats 30.* Under these conditions, going for it is the right move if the Colts scoring a touchdown, with two minutes left and one time out, from the Pats 30 is less than 2.2 times as likely as scoring a touchdown from their own 30 under similar circumstances. Is this the case? I don't think so, but who knows? In order to answer this with confidence I would need much more time and data than I have currently. My off-the-cuff expert estimation (watching just about every NFL game of the season qualifies me as an expert, in my mind) is that punting is the right move, but if Belichick felt his defense was particularly beaten down, or that his offense is exceptionally good at picking up two yards, then going for it might have been a good move.
This situation is precisely the time when a "Game Management Coach" could come in handy. NFL teams should hire people to crunch a bunch of data, so that they have good estimations of probabilities for a swath of scenarios. They should then pick the one who is the fastest on his or her feet and proclaim them the Game Management Coach. Their job is to follow the head coach around and tell him what to do. It is a great idea, but the chances of it happening anytime soon are probably pretty low. (By the way, this is the same basic idea put forth by Bill Simmons in this column's "Great Call of the Week". Although I disagree with his take on the "down by two scores in the final two minutes" conundrum. I also don't think Madden is the best NFL football game simulator, given that I once threw 8 TD passes to Terrell Owens in a game against a friend. Still, the larger point is a good one.)
*These seem reasonble because a) two yards is what is needed on a 2-point conversion and the success rate for them has been around 50% in recent years (this guy backs that up), but the Patriots have an above average offense, so I put it at 55%, b) the Pats can essentially run out the clock if they convert, c) a 42 yard net punt is reasonable, d) the 30 is a good round yard line.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
TMQ's Asinine Take on the Compensation of College Athletes
Below is an excerpt from this week's TMQ column concerning the compensation of college basketball players.
Last winter, Richard Vedder of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity, what we call in Washington a "boutique" think tank (it's really small), argued in the Wall Street Journal that college sports stars "receive compensation that amounts to only a very small percentage of what they would have earned if they sold their services in a competitive market." Vedder noted that Kevin Durant got about $33,000 in "compensation," in the form of tuition and expenses, in his year at the University of Texas, then jumped to $3.5 million a year when he entered the NBA. Colleges are keeping the money that basketball stars generated, Vedder contends, and therefore college athletes should form unions and demand pay.
Many, including TMQ reader Nasr Abdul-Mujeeb of Detroit, also think Division I football and men's basketball players should be paid: "The NCAA is using a free-labor system that lines the pockets of coaches, ADs and NCAA administrators, but provides little benefit to players, many of whom don't get a college education anyway." (Under "one and done," a college basketball player can attend classes in the fall, and then pay much less attention to classes in the spring, continuing to perform for that college while maintaining eligibility based on fall credits.) Surely if one considers only star players such a [Kevin] Durant, the NCAA is indeed benefiting from a free-labor system. But is that the way we should look at matters?
The basic argument for exploitation goes something like this. If a big name college basketball program had to pay their players, how much would they pay per year for a full squad? Is it safe to say $1.4 million? I think that's an underestimate, probably even a ridiculous underestimate, considering how much schools are willing to pay their coaches ($1.2 million per year for the power conference teams in the 2008 NCAA tournament) , not too mention how much competitive bidding for talent would drive up player compensation. Even using the modest estimate of $1.4 million per year, that's double what colleges pay their players now, assuming $40,000 (to be conservative I use this figure instead of TMQ's $33,000) per player per year. For better or worse, colleges are almost certainly paying their players a very small fraction of what they would be making under a free market. Players are getting a small slice of a big pie that they largely baked. To many, this is exploitation. If college players were paid market value, Kevin Durant probably would not have to "donate" scholarships to other players. They would be earning them outright, and then some.
*This is truly an asinine notion. Each year, there are hundreds of good college basketball players, who are key parts on good teams, who help draw fans and bring in money, that never crack the NBA. Why should their scholarships be considered donated?
Last winter, Richard Vedder of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity, what we call in Washington a "boutique" think tank (it's really small), argued in the Wall Street Journal that college sports stars "receive compensation that amounts to only a very small percentage of what they would have earned if they sold their services in a competitive market." Vedder noted that Kevin Durant got about $33,000 in "compensation," in the form of tuition and expenses, in his year at the University of Texas, then jumped to $3.5 million a year when he entered the NBA. Colleges are keeping the money that basketball stars generated, Vedder contends, and therefore college athletes should form unions and demand pay.
Many, including TMQ reader Nasr Abdul-Mujeeb of Detroit, also think Division I football and men's basketball players should be paid: "The NCAA is using a free-labor system that lines the pockets of coaches, ADs and NCAA administrators, but provides little benefit to players, many of whom don't get a college education anyway." (Under "one and done," a college basketball player can attend classes in the fall, and then pay much less attention to classes in the spring, continuing to perform for that college while maintaining eligibility based on fall credits.) Surely if one considers only star players such a [Kevin] Durant, the NCAA is indeed benefiting from a free-labor system. But is that the way we should look at matters?
During Durant's college season, 2006-07, there were 343 Division I men's basketball teams, each awarding 13 full scholarships, and 270 Division II basketball teams, each awarding 10 full scholarships, for a total of 7,159 men's basketball scholarships. (The numbers are now slightly different.) The following season, Durant's rookie year, there were 55 NBA players who had just left college, either early or as seniors. Since 55 from that college season advanced to the NBA, we can roughly judge that 55 of the 7,159 major-program basketball players that year were being exploited financially, while the other 7,104 were not. The other 7,104 players were coming out way ahead financially, as they were receiving free college educations -- if they had enough sense to go to class -- plus experiences that might help them in later life, especially in the business world. ("Wow, you played basketball at Boston College?")
Divide 7,159 by 55, and get 130. So each player from Durant's college season who might have been earning an NBA salary was supporting the college educations of another 130 players. This is the key thought missing from free-labor complaints about college basketball. Yes, the tiny fraction of players capable of advancing to the NBA do perform for far less than their market price, but they create economic value that lets large numbers of others go to college on scholarship. Assume the typical basketball scholarship is worth $33,000, which sounds a little low. (Full cost at the University of Texas for out-of-state students is currently $40,426) Those 7,159 scholarships are worth $236 million. So it's not pure exploitation -- $236 million is going to the players who make the college basketball system possible. It's up to those players to have the good sense to attend class and study -- what you accomplish in life is ultimately always up to you. But the scholarships created by the "free" play of NBA-capable collegians are the key consideration. In Durant's college year, he essentially donated 130 scholarships to other basketball players, worth $4.3 million. So actually his "compensation" was more than the $3.5 million he received the following season in the NBA. It's just that the compensation was not money in his pocket, it was the admirable act of financing other people's educations.
This is an embarrassingly weak defense of the status quo. The main reason lies in the sentences I put in bold. TMQ assumes that any college player who cannot play in the NBA is not being financially exploited, and will come out "way ahead." This assumption is completely unsupported, and in my estimation probably very untrue, especially for players in the power conferences (Pac-10, Big-10, ACC, Southeastern, Big East, Big 12). Even if a college hoopster does not play in the NBA, they are still providing a service for their university, and one off of which the university often makes a lot of money. They have worth to the university. (TMQ apparently disagrees, as he seems to think all scholarships are earned by future NBA players, and then "donated" to everybody else.*) I don't think it's at all appropriate to use what a college player will make in the NBA ($0 for almost all players, as TMQ points out) to establish their worth because they are not playing NBA basketball. Their worth should be determined by the college basketball market. But there is no real college basketball market, and that's exactly the point.The basic argument for exploitation goes something like this. If a big name college basketball program had to pay their players, how much would they pay per year for a full squad? Is it safe to say $1.4 million? I think that's an underestimate, probably even a ridiculous underestimate, considering how much schools are willing to pay their coaches ($1.2 million per year for the power conference teams in the 2008 NCAA tournament) , not too mention how much competitive bidding for talent would drive up player compensation. Even using the modest estimate of $1.4 million per year, that's double what colleges pay their players now, assuming $40,000 (to be conservative I use this figure instead of TMQ's $33,000) per player per year. For better or worse, colleges are almost certainly paying their players a very small fraction of what they would be making under a free market. Players are getting a small slice of a big pie that they largely baked. To many, this is exploitation. If college players were paid market value, Kevin Durant probably would not have to "donate" scholarships to other players. They would be earning them outright, and then some.
*This is truly an asinine notion. Each year, there are hundreds of good college basketball players, who are key parts on good teams, who help draw fans and bring in money, that never crack the NBA. Why should their scholarships be considered donated?
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Tim McCarver Quote
A quote from Tim McCarver: "[They say] lead off walks always score. And it's amazing how right they are."
I might have to start watching the World Series a little more closely. I think McCarver could be the source of some good material.
I might have to start watching the World Series a little more closely. I think McCarver could be the source of some good material.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Are Luck and Favorable Variation the Same Thing?
Recently, I attended a conference at which there were several talks analyzing aspects of competitive games. In one of them, the speaker contended that the qualifying mechanisms for the PGA Tour were not very good -- particularly Q-school. His basic argument was, due to natural variations in golfers' scores, the limited number of rounds in Q-school, and the ratio of qualifiers to participants, there was a decent probability that some relatively weak golfers would make the Q-school cut at the expense of more deserving golfers. (He backed this up with a statistical analysis using empirical data.) I don't remember the exact figure, but I think he estimated about a 20% probability that Phil Mickelson would fail to make the final Q-school cut, which is quite high considering he's probably one of the top ten golfers in the entire world, let alone those trying to qualify for the PGA Tour.
In explaining his work, the speaker kept using some form of the word "luck", as in, "given a large number of golfers it's almost inevitable that some of them are going to get lucky and beat people who are better than them." About halfway through the talk somebody in the audience stopped him and said, "I don't buy your premise that this is luck. I've played a lot of golf and watched a lot of golf. You don't luck your way through multiple rounds, you have to outplay people, so I'm not buying it." A somewhat contentious, back-and-forth ensued, before the speaker conceded the point and said, "fine, we have a disagreement on the definition of luck, so I'll just use the term 'favorable variation', from now on." This seemed to placate the man in the audience.
It made me think. Are luck and favorable variation the same thing? As an example, consider poker, a game in which luck and skill are both large factors. There are two basic ways a poker player can beat a superior opponent. The first is they get really lucky, in the conventional sense of the word. Their opponent completely outplays them, but through total chance, they hit their cards and win (think flushes and full houses on the river). This is obviously not sustainable (see the law of large numbers or this Mark Knopfler title). The second way is that the inferior opponent experiences favorable variation. They outplay their opponent on that particular occasion. Maybe they notice an aberrant betting tendency by their opponent and exploit it, or maybe they are just "in the zone", and they make all the right reads, while their opponent makes the wrong reads. This is not sustainable either, because their opponent is better and eventually will adapt, and the tides will turn, but is this luck? On the one hand, you might say "no", it's skill, the usually inferior player just played better. There is nothing lucky about it. On the other hand, you might say "yes". It is a deviation from the expectation that favored the inferior player, and in this sense it's indistinguishable from the first scenario.Whatever the answer, it's an interesting question.
In explaining his work, the speaker kept using some form of the word "luck", as in, "given a large number of golfers it's almost inevitable that some of them are going to get lucky and beat people who are better than them." About halfway through the talk somebody in the audience stopped him and said, "I don't buy your premise that this is luck. I've played a lot of golf and watched a lot of golf. You don't luck your way through multiple rounds, you have to outplay people, so I'm not buying it." A somewhat contentious, back-and-forth ensued, before the speaker conceded the point and said, "fine, we have a disagreement on the definition of luck, so I'll just use the term 'favorable variation', from now on." This seemed to placate the man in the audience.
It made me think. Are luck and favorable variation the same thing? As an example, consider poker, a game in which luck and skill are both large factors. There are two basic ways a poker player can beat a superior opponent. The first is they get really lucky, in the conventional sense of the word. Their opponent completely outplays them, but through total chance, they hit their cards and win (think flushes and full houses on the river). This is obviously not sustainable (see the law of large numbers or this Mark Knopfler title). The second way is that the inferior opponent experiences favorable variation. They outplay their opponent on that particular occasion. Maybe they notice an aberrant betting tendency by their opponent and exploit it, or maybe they are just "in the zone", and they make all the right reads, while their opponent makes the wrong reads. This is not sustainable either, because their opponent is better and eventually will adapt, and the tides will turn, but is this luck? On the one hand, you might say "no", it's skill, the usually inferior player just played better. There is nothing lucky about it. On the other hand, you might say "yes". It is a deviation from the expectation that favored the inferior player, and in this sense it's indistinguishable from the first scenario.Whatever the answer, it's an interesting question.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
He's just upset
A quote from Maurice Jones-Drew running back for the Jacksonville Jaguars expressing his discontent about not getting the ball enough and the offense in general during a loss to the Seattle Seahawks
I'm very frustrated. We're not consistent with anything. We had, what, 13 running plays last week? We weren't behind the whole game.
True, it was 0-0 for first drives of the game. The Seahawks scored on their second drive and went on to win 41-0.
I'm very frustrated. We're not consistent with anything. We had, what, 13 running plays last week? We weren't behind the whole game.
True, it was 0-0 for first drives of the game. The Seahawks scored on their second drive and went on to win 41-0.
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Week 4: TMQ Tidbit
Tidbit from this week's TMQ.
At the endgame, Green Bay faced a tactical dilemma TMQ thinks most coaches play wrongly. Down 30-20, facing a fourth-and-6 on the Minnesota 14 with one minute remaining, Green Bay kicked a field goal, then tried an onside kick. NFL coaches in this situation almost always take the field goal, then the onside kick. You need a touchdown and a field goal. If you take the field goal and then recover the onside kick, you are at least 50 yards from a touchdown. Before the field goal, Green Bay was only 14 yards from a touchdown. The Packers' chance of converting a fourth-and-6 and getting the touchdown from close range was greater than their chance of kicking a field goal and then scoring a touchdown from long range. Score the touchdown first, and if you recover the onside kick you're only 20 yards from the field goal attempt. TMQ thinks coaches almost always take the field goal in this situation because what they're really doing is playing to make the final score closer.
The bold font was added by me, because it's typical TMQ. Where does this statement come from? Is this just his guess? Does he actually have an estimate for the probability of winning in each scenario? The statement might very well be true, but it's by no means obvious. Sure, the Packers are closer than they would be after an on-side kick recovery, but it's 4th down. After the recovery it would be 1st down. This is a crucial point that he neglects to take into account. Let's say it was 4th and goal from the 14, instead of 4th and 6. Would TMQ still advocate going for it, under the same rationale: the Packers are only 14 yards away from the endzone, as opposed to the 50+ they would be after an on-side kick recovery? What about if it was 4th and 20 from the 25?
Also, I don't agree with his thought in the last sentence. I don't think that NFL coaches are playing to make the final score closer. I think NFL coaches are trying to win, but as I've mentioned before, I think they often equate putting off a loss with going for a win. If the Packers go for it, there is a decent chance they fail, and it's basically game over. If they kick there is a very good chance they make it, and they still have a slim hope of winning. Kicking might be the wrong move, but it's the move that has the highest probability of extending the game. And in scenarios like the one at hand, the move that has the highest probability of extending the game seems to be the one many NFL coaches prefer.
At the endgame, Green Bay faced a tactical dilemma TMQ thinks most coaches play wrongly. Down 30-20, facing a fourth-and-6 on the Minnesota 14 with one minute remaining, Green Bay kicked a field goal, then tried an onside kick. NFL coaches in this situation almost always take the field goal, then the onside kick. You need a touchdown and a field goal. If you take the field goal and then recover the onside kick, you are at least 50 yards from a touchdown. Before the field goal, Green Bay was only 14 yards from a touchdown. The Packers' chance of converting a fourth-and-6 and getting the touchdown from close range was greater than their chance of kicking a field goal and then scoring a touchdown from long range. Score the touchdown first, and if you recover the onside kick you're only 20 yards from the field goal attempt. TMQ thinks coaches almost always take the field goal in this situation because what they're really doing is playing to make the final score closer.
The bold font was added by me, because it's typical TMQ. Where does this statement come from? Is this just his guess? Does he actually have an estimate for the probability of winning in each scenario? The statement might very well be true, but it's by no means obvious. Sure, the Packers are closer than they would be after an on-side kick recovery, but it's 4th down. After the recovery it would be 1st down. This is a crucial point that he neglects to take into account. Let's say it was 4th and goal from the 14, instead of 4th and 6. Would TMQ still advocate going for it, under the same rationale: the Packers are only 14 yards away from the endzone, as opposed to the 50+ they would be after an on-side kick recovery? What about if it was 4th and 20 from the 25?
Also, I don't agree with his thought in the last sentence. I don't think that NFL coaches are playing to make the final score closer. I think NFL coaches are trying to win, but as I've mentioned before, I think they often equate putting off a loss with going for a win. If the Packers go for it, there is a decent chance they fail, and it's basically game over. If they kick there is a very good chance they make it, and they still have a slim hope of winning. Kicking might be the wrong move, but it's the move that has the highest probability of extending the game. And in scenarios like the one at hand, the move that has the highest probability of extending the game seems to be the one many NFL coaches prefer.
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